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ABSTRACT 
 
Researcher: Carolina Lenz Anderson 
Title: THE EFFECTS OF AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION RULES ON 
GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS 
 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation 
Year: 2013 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the frequency of general aviation airplane 
accidents and accident rates on the basis of aircraft certification to determine whether or 
not differences in aircraft certification rules had an influence on accidents.  In addition, 
the narrative cause descriptions contained within the accident reports were analyzed to 
determine whether there were differences in the qualitative data for the different 
certification categories.  The certification categories examined were: Federal Aviation 
Regulations Part 23, Civil Air Regulations 3, Light Sport Aircraft, and 
Experimental-Amateur Built.  The accident causes examined were those classified as: 
Loss of Control, Controlled Flight into Terrain, Engine Failure, and Structural Failure.   
Airworthiness certification categories represent a wide diversity of government 
oversight.  Part 23 rules have evolved from the initial set of simpler design standards and 
have progressed into a comprehensive and strict set of rules to address the safety issues of 
the more complex airplanes within the category.  Experimental-Amateur Built airplanes 
have the least amount of government oversight and are the fastest growing segment.  The 
Light Sport Aircraft category is a more recent certification category that utilizes 
consensus standards in the approval process.  Civil Air Regulations 3 airplanes were 
iv 
designed and manufactured under simpler rules but modifying these airplanes has 
become lengthy and expensive. 
The study was conducted using a mixed methods methodology which involves 
both quantitative and qualitative elements.  A Chi-Square test was used for a quantitative 
analysis of the accident frequency among aircraft certification categories.  Accident rate 
analysis of the accidents among aircraft certification categories involved an ANCOVA 
test.  The qualitative component involved the use of text mining techniques for the 
analysis of the narrative cause descriptions contained within the accident reports.   
The Chi-Square test indicated that there was no significant difference in the 
number of accidents among the different certification categories when either Controlled 
Flight into Terrain or Structural Failure was listed as cause.  However, there was a 
significant difference in the frequency of accidents with regard to Loss of Control and 
Engine Failure accidents.  The results of the ANCOVA test indicated that there was no 
significant difference in the accident rate with regard to Loss of Control, Controlled 
Flight into Terrain, or Structural Failure accidents.  There was, however, a significant 
difference in Engine Failure accidents between Experimental-Amateur Built and the other 
categories. 
The text mining analysis of the narrative causes of Loss of Control accidents 
indicated that only the Civil Air Regulations 3 category airplanes had clusters of words 
associated with visual flight into instrument meteorological conditions.  Civil Air 
Regulations 3 airplanes were designed and manufactured prior to the 1960s and in most 
cases have not been retrofitted to take advantage of newer technologies that could help 
prevent Loss of Control accidents.   
v 
The study indicated that General Aviation aircraft certification rules do not have a 
statistically significant effect on aircraft accidents except for Loss of Control and Engine 
Failure.  According to the literature, government oversight could have become an 
obstacle in the implementation of safety enhancing equipment that could reduce Loss of 
Control accidents.  Oversight should focus on ensuring that Experimental-Amateur Built 
aircraft owners perform a functional test that could prevent some of the Engine Failure 
accidents.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Aviation in the United States is an extremely important element of our national 
and international stature.  Indeed, aviation undergirds all political, economic, and military 
elements of our society.  For example, the U.S. is recognized as the world leader in 
aircraft manufacturing that includes the manufacture of general aviation (GA) aircraft.  
There are more GA aircraft in the U.S. than the rest of the world combined (National 
Research Council, 2006). 
The methods of aircraft certification used in the U.S. have become respected the 
world over.  These oversight methods for aircraft production and service have led to 
many economic opportunities for U.S. aircraft manufacturers because of the high quality 
of products that have resulted.  This is particularly important for large aircraft 
manufacturers such as the Boeing Company.  However, one segment of the aircraft 
manufacturing landscape has suffered.  The production of general aviation, entry-level 
aircraft1 has declined largely due to changes in small aircraft certification regulations 
(Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2009). 
Aircraft certification regulations are intended to ensure the airworthiness of 
aircraft by requiring manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft components to comply with 
approved aircraft designs, maintenance requirements, and operational limitations.  The 
main objective of aircraft certification and continued airworthiness requirements is to 
increase the reliability of safety critical systems (Committee on Aircraft Certification 
                                                 
1 In the context of this study, entry-level aircraft or airplane means an aircraft that might 
be used or acquired in the beginning of an  individual’s flying experience. 
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Safety Management [CACSM], 1998).  While strict certification requirements represent 
high standards for aircraft manufacturers, in the last three decades new GA aircraft 
certification costs have increased, the number of GA aircraft produced has decreased, and 
there have been no accompanying substantial changes in operational safety or accident 
rates (Bowles, 2010).   
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations that  govern  today’s  
aircraft are found in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) (FAA, 2013c).  
Airworthiness and certification standards for airplanes in the normal, utility, and 
aerobatic categories with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or less 
are contained within 14 CFR Part 23 (Part 23) regulations (FAA, 2013c).   
According to 2009 data of the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), the 
U.S. civil aviation manufacturing industry that produces civilian aircraft, engines, and 
parts recorded a positive trade balance of over $75 billion.  In 2009, civil aviation 
supported over 10 million jobs and contributed $1.3 trillion in total economic activity to 
the U.S. economy, accounting for 5.2% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (FAA, 
2011c).  GA’s  overall contribution to the U.S. economy was 0.3% of the U.S. GDP and 
GA aircraft manufacturing alone contributed 0.1% of the U.S. GDP (FAA, 2011c).  For 
the U.S. to maintain its competitive edge worldwide, the certification process for 
aerospace products has to be dynamic, adapt to change, leverage new technologies, and 
both facilitate and encourage new knowledge.   
Since the 1980s, the regulatory scope of Part 23 has been shifted to address more 
complex aircraft, placing an excessive burden on the certification of simpler aircraft 
(FAA, 2009).  In 2009, the FAA began a Part 23 Certification Process Study (CPS) to 
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assess the adequacy of the current certification and airworthiness standards processes 
(FAA, 2009).  Following the recommendations of the CPS in August 2011, the FAA 
created a Part 23 Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) (FAA, 2011b).  The ARC was 
tasked with completely restructuring Part 23 and with sub-dividing the category into tiers 
based on airplane performance and complexity, as opposed to the existing weight and 
propulsion classifications, thereby allowing the FAA to target the required regulations 
and oversight specifically to each tier as necessary (FAA, 2009, p. 15).  Tasking for the 
ARC also included a re-write of the regulations on a broad, general, and progressive 
level.  The ARC meetings were concluded in January of 2013; the recommendations of 
the ARC were submitted to the FAA in May of 2013 (Pompeo, 2013), and a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) is expected to be issued in 2014 (FAA, 2011b).  One of 
the recommendations from the ARC is to develop a set of industry consensus standards 
that will become the means of compliance for the certification approval process of the 
new Part 23 regulations (Part 23 ARC, 2012).  As a result of the ARC meetings, a new 
GA aircraft certification chapter was created within an international consensus standards 
organization, American Standards for Testing and Materials (ASTM), ASTM F44.  
The use of industry consensus standards is consistent with Public Law 104-113, 
also known as the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 
(NTTAA), signed by President Clinton in March 1996.  NTTAA encourages federal 
agencies in the U.S. to utilize standards developed by voluntary consensus standards 
bodies rather than government-unique standards, wherever possible.  The Act also 
includes provisions that encourage federal agencies to partner with the private sector in 
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the development of these standards to help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
government (National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act, 1996).  
In the early 2000s, GA advocacy groups, such as the Experimental Aircraft 
Association (EAA) and the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), 
became concerned with rising certification costs and dwindling pilot populations.  As a 
result, these advocacy groups petitioned the FAA to apply NTTAA to an aviation case.  
In 2004, the FAA initiated a test case with the certification of a new aircraft category, 
Light Sport Aircraft (LSA), utilizing consensus standards (Bowles, 2010).  Two 
categories within the LSA class were created: Special-Light Sport Aircraft (S-LSA) and 
Experimental-Light Sport Aircraft (E-LSA).  ASTM was chosen for the implementation 
and management of the LSA industry consensus standards.  Early indicators show that 
this new category has been a success; thus, the propagation of consensus standards to 
more mainstream uses has become an appealing option applicable to other segments of 
aviation (FAA, 2009). 
Part 23 airplanes have been essential in pilot flight training.  However,  “[a] 
consequence of the difficult regulatory environment has been the high cost of 
certification and a corresponding reduction of new entry-level products  within  part  23”  
(FAA, 2009, p. 15).  The few new certified entry-level airplanes that are produced come 
at a very high cost due to the lengthy and expensive certification requirements.  As a 
result, the existing flight training fleet of airplanes is composed of aircraft produced 
decades ago (GAMA, 2012).  Retrofitting these old aircraft with new technologies would 
involve a lengthy and expensive re-certification process, which inhibits many pilots from 
taking advantage of new technologies.  In 2008, the average age of piston aircraft with 
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seating capacities of one-to-three seats was 48 years, and the average age for four-seat 
aircraft was 38 years (GAMA, 2012).  As a result, most pilots currently learn to fly in 
30-year old Cessnas and Pipers or in newer aircraft that were designed and received 
initial certification over 30 years ago.  Due to the stringent Part 23 regulatory 
requirements, these older aircraft designs cannot accommodate the new safety 
technologies that have become common such as Ballistic Recovery Parachutes (BRS) and 
air bags (FAA, 2009).  Over the last two decades, the U.S. active pilot population has 
been in decline, with an average decline of 10,000 pilots per year (GAMA, 2012).  The 
reduction in the active pilot population is a growing concern, as many experts predict a 
worldwide pilot shortage (Boeing, 2012).  “Over  the  last  decade  the  number  of  active  
private  pilots  has  been  declining  and  the  number  of  new  pilot  starts  hasn’t  kept  pace.    
Revitalizing the entry-level airplane market can have a beneficial effect on attracting new 
pilots  in  the  safest  manner  possible”  (FAA,  2009,  p.  19).     
As of 2013, there were 13 aircraft manufacturers of Part 23 certified two-seat or 
four-seat piston aircraft in the U.S. (GAMA, 2012); most of these Part 23 aircraft 
manufacturers have been in operation for over 30 years.  Since the creation of the LSA 
category in 2004, 20 new U.S. manufacturers of LSA aircraft have emerged (Johnson, 
2013).  The pilot population has increased by 4,066 pilots since 2004, when the new LSA 
rules were implemented.  This figure represents an important contribution to an industry 
in which the total active pilot population has been dwindling over the last decade 
(GAMA, 2012).  Part 23 has also been the entry point for many new aircraft technologies, 
including composite materials, satellite navigation and approaches, integrated glass 
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cockpits, synthetic vision, and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), 
among others (Bowles, 2010).   
The Experimental-Amateur Built (E-AB) category constitutes the fastest growing 
segment of the GA fleet in the U.S. (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 
2012).  E-AB aircraft are defined by the FAA as aircraft in which at least 51% of the 
aircraft was fabricated and assembled by an individual or group of individuals and 
undertook the construction project solely for their own education or recreation.  In 2011, 
there were approximately 33,000 E-AB aircraft registered, a 10% increase from 2008, 
making E-AB aircraft the fastest growing segment of the GA fleet (National 
Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2012a).  On the other hand, the number of 
accidents involving E-AB aircraft has increased since 1999 through 2011; E-AB aircraft 
accounted for 14% of airplanes in nonfatal GA accidents and approximately 21% of fatal 
accidents.  Many of the accidents involving E-AB aircraft occurred during the first 50 
hours of flight, known as the flight test period (NTSB, 2012b). 
Revitalizing the entry-level airplane market could have a beneficial effect on 
attracting new pilots, invigorating the manufacturing industry, and facilitating the retrofit 
of an aging fleet of over 200,000 airplanes.  The use of international industry consensus 
standards for aircraft certification may be an appealing alternative for the U.S. to 
maintain the competitive edge in a globalized marketplace.   
Significance of the Study 
The significance of the study was to shed new light on the relationship that 
various aircraft certification processes have to GA aircraft accidents.  The aircraft 
certification categories used in the study included:  
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(a) Civil Air Regulations 3 (CAR 3)2, these rules are the preceding set of rules 
before Part 23 rules were implemented;  
(b) E-AB, these rules have the least amount of government oversight and is the 
fastest growing segment in GA;  
(c) LSA, these rules are ones that reflect industry consensus standards; and  
(d) Part 23, these rules are the current certification rules for GA aircraft and have 
become increasingly stricter to address the safety concerns of the more complex 
airplanes within the category. 
Piston airplanes, most of which are currently regulated by Part 23 rules, account 
for over 60% of the civil aircraft fleet.  Most of these are GA airplanes that have been 
essential both in pilot flight training and as the entry point for many new aircraft 
technologies.  While strict certification requirements represent high standards for aircraft 
manufacturers, Part 23 rules have been shifting since 1980 to address more complex 
airplanes.  As a result, aircraft certification costs have increased while the overall 
accident rate in GA has remained relatively steady.  It is important, therefore, to study the 
impact of certification standards on GA accidents. 
Statement of the Problem 
Aircraft certification under Part 23 has grown out of the initial set of design 
standards that began back in the 1920s.  The relatively simple regulations known as 
CAR 3 evolved into increasingly comprehensive rules to both address safety issues that 
emerged with the growing number of aircraft in service and to deal with the increasing 
complexity due to the incorporation of new technologies.  These new more stringent rules 
                                                 
2 CAR 3 airplanes for this study also included airplanes certified under CAR 4a, and Aeronautics Bulletin 
No. 7 
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were also applicable to modifications of existing airplanes, making the retrofit and the 
application of new technologies to an existing and aging GA fleet difficult and expensive 
(FAA, 2009; General Aviation Joint Steering Committee [GAJSC], 2012). 
In 2013, Part 23 consists of a large body of regulatory material that relies on a 
system of overlapping Advisory Circulars (ACs) and, to a lesser extent, industry 
standards to define safety requirements.  A significant portion of the regulations are so 
prescriptive that airplane manufacturers are inhibited from finding more efficient and 
economical methods of compliance with acceptable levels of safety (Part 23 ARC, 2012).  
ACs provide interpretations of the regulations as well as a means of compliance; 
however, ACs are meant to provide guidance and are not regulatory in nature.  In 
practice, it has been found that in some cases that the means of compliance presented in 
ACs have been treated as the only acceptable means of compliance.  By incorporating 
very specific technical requirements, Part 23 rules have become very prescriptive in 
nature.  The introduction of new technologies has become very difficult because 
implementing the new technologies often requires a rule change, which is a very lengthy 
process (Part 23 ARC, 2012). 
One of the recommendations from the Part 23 ARC is to maintain only very basic 
performance-based safety requirements within the Part 23 regulations, while removing 
the prescriptive methods and technology dependent guidance from the FARs, by 
changing the methods of compliance to industry consensus standards.  In addition, the 
use of industry consensus standards has the potential of simplifying the retrofit of older 
airplanes, as these standards can be easily updated when new technologies become 
available without the need for special conditions, equivalent methods of compliance, or 
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exemptions (Part 23 ARC, 2012).  Currently, the LSA category approval process utilizes 
industry consensus standards (ASTM, 2012). 
According to the NTSB (2012a), the accident rate for both fatal and non-fatal 
accidents has remained relatively steady in the last ten years.  GA comprises a wide range 
of operations and aircraft.  The majority of GA accidents involve personal flying in fixed-
wing airplanes (NTSB, 2012a).  The three leading causes of fatal accidents in GA are 
Loss of Control (LOC), Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT), and System/Component 
Failure or Malfunction /Powerplant (Stephens, 2012).   
It is important to explore whether the government oversight within the different 
GA airworthiness certification categories has had an effect on the prevention or reduction 
of aircraft accidents.  It is also important to research whether government oversight might 
have become an obstacle in the certification of new aviation products or on the adoption 
of new technologies into old airplanes. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the frequency of GA airplane accidents 
and accident rates on the basis of aircraft certification to determine whether or not 
differences in aircraft certification rules had an influence on accidents.  In addition, the 
narrative cause descriptions contained within the accident reports were analyzed to 
determine whether there were differences in the qualitative data for the different 
certification categories.  The certification categories examined were: Part 23, CAR 3, 
LSA, and E-AB.  The top three causes of fatal GA accidents were of interest to this 
study; in addition, Structural Failure accidents were also of interest, as Structural Failure 
is one of the failures or malfunctions that aircraft certification is designed to prevent.  The 
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accident causes examined were those listed as: LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, and 
Structural Failure in the time period between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2011.   
Hypotheses 
Eight main hypotheses were studied. These hypotheses were: 
H01: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among 
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard 
to accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
H02: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among 
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard 
to accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
H03: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among 
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard 
to accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
H04: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among 
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard 
to accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
H05: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes 
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to 
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
H06: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes 
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to 
accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
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H07: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes 
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to 
accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
H08: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes 
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to 
accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
Delimitations 
The entry-level airplanes within Part 23 have been identified by the FAA (2009) 
as being the most affected by the increased difficulty and cost of certification.  Aircraft 
certified under Part 23 are limited to a passenger seating capacity of nine or less, except 
for the commuter aircraft within Part 23 that have a maximum passenger seating capacity 
of 19 passengers.  In order to compare airplane accidents based on certification basis, Part 
23, CAR 3, S-LSA, E-LSA and E-AB, the complexities and missions of these aircraft 
have to be comparable; therefore, this study focused on studying accidents involving 
airplanes defined as fixed-wing, single-engine, reciprocating-piston airplanes.  By 
limiting the type of operation to non-commercial operations or FAR Part 91 operations 
that include personal use and flight instruction, the missions of the airplanes utilized in 
the study were similar.  The time period selected was between January 1, 2004, and 
December 31, 2011, in order to include the LSA category that was created in 2004.   
Limitations and Assumptions 
One of the major limitations with GA activity data is that the number of hours 
flown per year and other activity information is obtained from the GA survey (GAO, 
2012).  Despite the FAA’s  efforts  to  improve  the GA survey over the years, the survey 
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has some limitations because the data collected are provided voluntarily from aircraft 
owners and operators.  In order to maintain a more accurate count of the number of active 
aircraft, in 2010 the FAA began requiring owners and operators of aircraft to renew 
aircraft registrations every three years (GAO, 2012). 
This research focused on comparing the frequency of aircraft accidents and 
accident rates, involving fixed-wing single-engine reciprocating-piston airplanes based 
on the following airworthiness certification categories: Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA, E-LSA, 
and E-AB categories.  Accident rates are the preferred measure to compare aircraft 
accidents because they account for the amount of activity; however, the number of hours 
flown per year, which is necessary to calculate accident rate, is only given for 
Part 23/CAR 3 and S-LSA/E-LSA categories grouped together.  Therefore, an alternative 
method was also selected; this alternative method consisted of comparing the frequency 
of accidents for each of the categories separately, including Part 23 and CAR 3, utilizing 
a Chi-Square test. 
The Chi-Square test compares the observed and expected frequencies; the test 
determines if the expected values differ significantly from the observed values, but it 
does not account for the amount of activity among airworthiness categories.  Since the 
LSA category is relatively new and there were no accidents in 2004 and very few 
accidents in 2005, some of the expected frequencies for the Chi-Square test had values of 
less than five.  To solve this problem, the S-LSA and E-LSA categories were grouped 
together and it was necessary to segregate the data into two-year segments covering the 
period from 2004 to 2011.  Since the sample size was large the approximation of the Chi-
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Square distribution improves and the low expected counts are not as problematic (Field, 
2009).   
Pilot proficiency could be a contributing factor in GA aircraft accidents, 
especially in E-AB airplanes (FAA, 2011a).  Pilot  proficiency  is  defined  as:  “the  state  of  
performing a given skill with expert correctness" (Soaring Safety Foundation [SSF], n.d., 
para. 2).  However, pilot proficiency is not listed as a variable in the NTSB database 
because it can be a subjective measure.  An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) statistical 
test with covariates, also known as Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA), was utilized for 
the study.  To take pilot experience into account, the number of total hours of flight time 
of the pilot was used as a covariate. 
Definition of Terms 
14 CFR Part 23  Part 23 within Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
contains airworthiness and certification standards for 
airplanes in the normal, utility, and aerobatic categories, 
with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 
pounds or less (FAA, 2012). 
Aircraft Device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the 
air, it includes airplanes, helicopters, gliders among others 
(FAA, 2012). 
Airplane Engine-driven fixed-wing aircraft, heavier than air that are 
supported in flight by the dynamic reaction of the air 
against its wings (FAA, 2012). 
Certification Basis The certification basis identifies the applicable standards to 
which the Applicant must show compliance. It also includes 
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the need for special conditions, exemptions, and equivalent 
safety findings, if any. An issues list should be included to 
highlight those special requirements needing resolution and 
other areas that may be significant, even though they may not 
warrant a special condition, exemption, or equivalent safety 
finding (Aerospace Industries Association [AIA], GAMA & 
FAA, 2004). 
Entry-level airplane In the context of this study, entry-level aircraft or airplane 
means an aircraft that one might use or acquire in the 
beginning of their flying experience. 
General Aviation All non-military aviation operations other than scheduled 
air services and air transport for remuneration or hire.  
These operations include flight instruction, business, 
personal, and aerial work among others (Wensveen, 2007). 
Pilot proficiency   “[T]he state of performing a given skill with expert 
correctness." (SSF, n.d., para. 2). 
List of Acronyms 
14 CFR Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
AC Advisory Circular 
ACO Aircraft Certification Office 
ACPRR/ARC Aircraft Certification Process Review and Reform/Aviation 
Rulemaking Committee 
 
AD Airworthiness Directive 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
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AIA Aerospace Industries Association 
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
AIR Aircraft Certification Service 
ANCOVA Analysis of Covariance 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
AOA Angle of Attack 
ARC Aviation Rulemaking Committee 
ASME American Society for Mechanical Engineers 
ASTM American Society of Testing and Materials 
ASTM F44 American Society of Testing and Materials Chapter F44 
BRS Ballistic Recovery Parachutes 
CAA  Civil Aeronautics Authority 
CACSM Committee on Aircraft Certification Safety Management 
CAR Civil Air Regulation 
CAR 3 Civil Air Regulation 3 
CFI Certified Flight Instructor 
CFIT Controlled Flight into Terrain 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CPS Certification Process Study 
DER Designated Engineering Representative  
DoD Department of Defense 
DOT Department of Transportation 
EAA Experimental Aircraft Association 
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E-AB Experimental-Amateur Built 
EAC Eclipse Aviation Corporation 
EIA/GEIA Electronic Industries Alliance/Government Electronics and 
Information Technology Association 
 
E-LSA Experimental-Light Sport Aircraft 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations 
FAWG Future of Aerospace Working Group 
GA General Aviation 
GAJSC General Aviation Joint Steering Committee 
GAMA General Aviation Manufacturers Association 
GAO Government Accountability Office  
GARA General Aviation Revitalization Act 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GPS Global Positioning System  
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization  
ICAT International Center for Air Transportation 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
IPC Institute for Printed Circuits 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
LOC Loss of Control 
LSA Light Sport Aircraft 
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LTSP Light-Sport Special Category (NTSB database variable name) 
MIDO Manufacturing Inspection District Office 
Mil-specs Military-specifications  
MSR Military Specifications Reform 
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
NTTAA National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act 
ODA Organization Delegation Authorization 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
Part 23 14 CFR Part 23 
Part 25 14 CFR Part 25 
PMA Parts Manufacturing Approval 
SAE Society of Aerospace Engineers 
SFAR Special Federal Airworthiness Regulation 
S-LSA Special-Light Sport Aircraft 
SPE Special Category Experimental (NTSB database variable name) 
SPL Special Category Limited (NTSB database variable name) 
SPR Special Category Restricted (NTSB database variable name) 
SPS Special Flight (NTSB database variable name) 
SPSS Statistical Product and Service Solutions previously Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences 
 
SPV Special Provisional 
SSF Soaring Safety Foundation 
STA Standard Category Aerobatic (NTSB database variable name) 
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STC Supplemental Type Certificates  
STN  Standard Category Normal (NTSB database variable name) 
STT Special Transport (NTSB database variable name) 
STU Standard Category Utility (NTSB database variable name) 
TSOA Technical Standard Order Authorization 
UNK Unknown (NTSB database variable name)  
USITC United States International Trade Commission 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The literature review provides a summary of the aircraft certification rules, an 
overview of the existing GA fleet, an overview of the past present and future of GA, and 
a summary of the evolution of aircraft certification regulations and airworthiness 
standards.  The current problems with Part 23 certification rules were examined, as well 
as the main causes of accidents in GA.  The main causes of accidents in GA were utilized 
in the study to compare the frequency of accidents and accident rates among the different 
aircraft certification categories. 
Aircraft certification regulations are intended to promote the airworthiness of 
aircraft by requiring manufacturers, components manufacturers, and operators of aircraft 
to comply with approved aircraft designs, maintenance requirements, and operational 
limitations.  An airworthiness certificate is required to allow an aircraft to be operated as 
a civil aircraft in the U.S..  The main objective of aircraft certification and continued 
airworthiness requirements is to increase the reliability of safety critical systems.  The 
current regulations are mature and have evolved throughout the years (CACSM, 1998). 
In the U.S., piston airplanes account for 67% of the total civil aviation aircraft 
population, followed by experimental airplanes at 11% (Figure 1).  The number of piston 
airplanes manufactured annually has been decreasing substantially over the years.  
According to GAMA (2012), the U.S. produced 15,594 piston airplanes in 1947; 
however, only 1,514 piston airplanes were produced in 2012.  The reduction in the 
number of aircraft produced represents a decline of over 90% (see Figure 2).   
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Figure 1.  U.S. civil aviation aircraft population.  Adapted from General Aviation 
Statistical Databook and Industry Outlook by GAMA, 2012 and Small Airplanes by 
G. Bowles, 2012.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  U.S. Part 23 airplanes manufactured annually.  Adapted from General Aviation 
Statistical Databook and Industry Outlook by GAMA, 2012.   
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share with the introduction of turbo-prop and jet airplanes, (b) the evolution of the 
product liability law, (c) natural disasters, (d) wars, (e) terrorist attacks, (f) economic 
downturns, (g) increasing fuel prices, and (h) rising certification costs (FAA, 2009; 
GAMA, 2012; Shetty & Hansman, 2012). 
Part 23 certified entry-level two-seat and four-seat airplanes are essential in pilot 
flight training.  The price of new entry-level airplanes has increased at a much higher rate 
than the standard inflation (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3.  Four-seat entry-level airplane comparison.   
Note: The airplane base retail prices in the chart are for the following airplanes in order 
from left to right: Cessna 170 in 1948, Aeronca Sedan in 1948, Cessna 172 in 1956, 
Maule M-4 in 1962, Mooney Master in 1963, Beech Musketter in 1963, Piper Cherokee 
in 1964, Gruman Cheetah in 1972, Beech Sundowner in 1974, Grumman Tiger in 1975, 
Socata Tampico in 1990, Cirrus SR-20 in 1999, Diamond Star in 2000, Cessna 172 in 
2012, and Cessna 182 in 2012.  Standard inflationary rates against $5475 in 1948 were 
utilized.  Adapted from presentation, Small Airplanes, by G. Bowles, 2010. 
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entry-level products  within  part  23”  (FAA,  2009,  p. 15).  A growing concern also exists 
about the number of active pilots in the U.S..  In 2012, the U.S. had 188,001 private 
pilots, which represented over 100,000 fewer private pilots than in 1992.  In 1992, the 
private pilot population was at 288,078 (GAMA, 2012).  In 2012, the number of sport 
pilots has increased 10.5% to 4,493 (see Figure 4), while the number of private pilots has 
been decreasing at an average rate of 10,000 pilots per year (GAMA, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 4.  U.S. pilot population.  Adapted from General Aviation Statistical Databook 
and Industry Outlook by GAMA, 2012.   
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(Gesell & Dempsey, 2005).  The second GA industry crisis has been the result of a 
combination of an economic recession that began at the end of 2007 combined with 
rising certification costs.   
The 1960s and 1970s were marked by strong support from the U.S. government to 
protect the rights of consumers (Gesell & Dempsey, 2005).  As a result, businesses were 
mandated to stand behind their products.  The underlying product liability decisions were 
based on the theory that those selling products are in a better position to absorb losses 
than the consumer.  Hence, the product liability law shifted the responsibility for liability 
from individuals to corporations (Gesell & Dempsey, 2005).  As a result, the cost of 
product liability insurance increased by orders of magnitude.  This change in the product 
liability insurance has had a negative effect upon the GA manufacturing industry in the 
U.S..  By the 1980s, the product liability laws made the industry the responsible party, 
not the consumer (Gesell & Dempsey, 2005). 
In 1978, U.S. GA manufacturers produced almost 18,000 GA aircraft for 
domestic use and for export (Wooley & Peters, 2012).  The U.S. was the world leader in 
the production of GA aircraft but by 1993, production had dwindled to fewer than 1,000 
aircraft.  As a result, over 100,000 jobs were lost in GA manufacturing (Wooley & 
Peters, 2012).   
According to Gesell and Dempsey (2005), the cost of product liability insurance 
for GA aircraft manufacturers in 1962 was $51 per aircraft spread over 6,778 aircraft 
produced that year.  In 1972, the cost of product liability insurance increased to $2,111 
per aircraft spread over 9,774 aircraft produced that year.  By 1985, the average cost of 
product liability insurance averaged $70,000 per aircraft, allocated among approximately 
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2,000 aircraft delivered that year.  Between 1981 and 1985, the average cost of product 
liability rose over 500%, and in some isolated cases this cost increased to as much as 
3,000% (Gesell & Dempsey, 2005).  The average cost of product liability insurance per 
airplane was higher than the cost of most single-engine airplanes (Wooley & Peters, 
2012).  In May of 1986, Cessna announced that they would cease production of piston-
powered aircraft, including their training airplanes.  Piper Aircraft, the other leading 
producer of low-cost training aircraft, went into bankruptcy and completely stopped 
production in 1991 (Hudson, 1998). 
In order to revive an industry on the edge of extinction, Congress passed the 
General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA) of 1994 (General Aviation Revitalization 
Act, 1994).  The Act established an 18 year statute of repose for GA aircraft and aircraft 
components beyond which the manufacturer will not be liable in lawsuits alleging 
defective manufacture or design.  The Act is limited to aircraft with a seating capacity of 
20 passengers or less that are not engaged in scheduled operations carrying passengers.  
Some exceptions include willful fraud, medical evacuation, or people injured on the 
ground (Brady, 2000).  This Act intended to provide relief; revive airplane 
manufacturing, engineering, sales, marketing, repair, maintenance, and related industries.  
This Act also intended to support the then dying GA industry (General Aviation 
Revitalization Act, 1994). 
After GARA, GA aviation activity slowly recovered until the 1990s, when the 
Gulf War, natural disasters–such as hurricane Andrew, and an economic downturn 
resulted in another decline in GA’s  operational  activity (Shetty & Hansman, 2012).  GA’s 
operational activity increased again for about five years in the early 2000s until an 
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economic downturn compounded with the 9/11 terrorists attacks, rising fuel prices, and a 
worldwide economic recession at the end of the decade.  Concurrently, there has been a 
decline in the pilot and aircraft population, an increase in the price of new aircraft, and an 
older active aircraft population (Shetty & Hansman, 2012). 
Since the 1980s, three related facts remain: (a) new GA aircraft certification costs 
have increased, (b) the number of GA aircraft produced has decreased, and (c) no 
considerable changes in operational safety or accident rates have occurred (Bowles, 
2010).  The economic recession that began in December 2007 in the U.S., has further 
increased the GA industry’s  downturn (Shetty & Hansman, 2012).  
Since the early 2000s, the number of active private pilots has also been declining 
(GAMA, 2012).  The average age of the GA fleet is 40 years.  Retrofitting old airplanes 
with new equipment often requires a lengthy and expensive re-certification process.  
Revitalizing the entry-level airplane market could have a beneficial effect on attracting 
new pilots, as well as on allowing the implementation of new technologies that could 
enhance safety (FAA, 2009). 
On May 7, 2013, a bipartisan group of U.S. House of Representative’s members 
led by Congressman Mike Pompeo, introduced the Small Aircraft Revitalization Act of 
2013.  This bill aims to establish a deadline for the implementation of the Part 23 ARC 
recommendations (Small Aircraft Revitalization Act, 2013).  According to Pompeo 
(2013):  “[t]his legislation will improve safety, decrease costs, and free private-sector 
innovation to revitalize this important industry”  (p.  1). 
Importance of GA to the U.S. economy.  Civil aviation consists of non-military 
aviation, both private and commercial.  GA consists of non-scheduled civil aviation 
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activity.  Civil aviation has been essential to the U.S. economy, and it constitutes a very 
important component of the U.S. transportation system.  According to the FAA (2011a), 
in 2009, civil aviation supported over 10 million jobs, contributed $1.3 trillion in total 
economic activity, and accounted for 5.2% of total U.S. GDP.    GA’s  contribution  to  the  
U.S. economy, including GA operations, GA manufacturing, and GA visitor 
expenditures, was 0.3% of the U.S. GDP (see Table 1).  GA aircraft manufacturing 
contributed to 0.1% of the U.S. GDP (FAA, 2011c). 
Civil aviation consists of commercial aviation and GA.  Between 2008 and 2009, 
real primary output for civil aviation as a whole fell 9.4%.  Commercial aviation primary 
output dropped 8.6% during the same period, while the primary output in GA fell 21.9%.  
Primary output is used to calculate the total economic impact of civil aviation.  To isolate 
changes in civil aviation spending from inflationary effects, the nominal primary output 
measures are transformed into constant 2005 dollars (FAA, 2011c). 
GA operations contributed $38.9 billion to the total output.  In the U.S., GA has 
access to more than 5,178 public-use airports and a significant number of private airports, 
making GA one of the major national airport users (FAA, 2010b).  During the years of 
2008 and 2009, the U.S. and global economic recession had a detrimental effect on civil 
aviation, resulting in a decrease in GA manufacturing of 22.1% and a decrease in the 
number of GA jobs by 19.5% (FAA, 2011c). 
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Table 1.  Civil Aviation Contribution to U.S. GDP in 2009.   
 
Impact Type Value Added ($Billions) Percent of GDP 
Airline Operations 150.5 1.1 
Airport Operations 44.6 0.3 
Civilian Aircraft Manufacturing 39.6 0.3 
Civilian Aircraft Parts 10.2 0.1 
Civilian Other Equipment 36.9 0.3 
Air Couriers 40.8 0.3 
Visitor Expenditures 359.3 2.5 
Travel Arrangements 7.5 0.1 
Sub-total Commercial 689.3 4.9 
GA Operations 19.7 0.1 
GA Manufacturing 12.1 0.1 
GA Visitor Expenditures 7.1 0.1 
Sub-total GA 38.9 0.3 
Total Impact 728.2 5.2 
Note.  Adapted from FAA (2011a). 
 
 
 
Overall, GA flight hours dropped nearly 25% between 2000 and 2009.  “Most of 
the decrease in GA flight hours is due in part to the dramatic drop in flight hours by 
piston engine airplanes”  (FAA,  2011a,  p.30).  Piston-engine airplane flight hours dropped 
nearly 39% between 2000 and 2009, while turboprop, jet, and rotorcraft GA airplanes 
increased by 9%, 14.7%, and 30.1%, respectively, during the same period (FAA, 2011c). 
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Light Sport Aircraft category.  In March, 1996, President Clinton signed Public 
Law 104-113, also known as the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 
1995 (NTTAA, 1996).  The primary purpose of the NTTAA is to ensure that government 
agencies attain greater reliance on voluntary consensus standards developed by the 
private sector and decrease the dependence on government-unique standards that were 
developed by and for the government (NTTAA, 1996).  GA advocacy groups that were 
concerned about the rising certification costs and dwindling pilot populations petitioned 
the FAA to apply NTTAA to an aviation case.   
In 2004, the FAA initiated a test case with the certification of the new LSA 
aircraft utilizing consensus standards (Bowles, 2010).  ASTM was chosen for the 
implementation and management of LSA consensus standards.  Founded in 1898, ASTM 
has been recognized internationally as a leader in the development and delivery of 
international voluntary consensus standards.  These standards are not limited to aviation 
fuel standards; the standards also include normal and utility aircraft electrical wiring 
systems, metallurgy, and many others (ASTM, 2012).  Early indicators show that the 
LSA category has been a success; thus, the propagation of consensus standards to more 
mainstream uses has become an appealing option applicable to other segments of aviation 
(FAA, 2009). 
Part 23 Certification Process Study (CPS).  Historically, the FAA has hosted 
regulatory reviews for Part 23 approximately every ten years.  However, the two most 
recent reviews of Part 23 were performed in 1974 and in 1984 (FAA, 2009).  In 2009, the 
FAA began a Part 23 CPS to assess the adequacy of the current airworthiness standards.  
In August 2011, following the recommendations of the CPS, the FAA created a Part 23 
29 
 
ARC.  The CPS report included recommendations in five main areas: (a) performance 
based standards for Part 23 certification, (b) design certification, (c) continued 
airworthiness, (d) data management, and (e) pilot interface (FAA, 2009). 
The CPS recommended the reorganization of Part 23 and the creation of tiers 
based on airplane performance and complexity as opposed to the existing weight and 
propulsion classifications.  It was also recommended that certification requirements for 
Part 23 airplanes be written on a broad general and progressive level of tiers based on 
complexity and with a level of regulatory oversight that is consistent with this 
classification (FAA, 2009). 
The design certification recommendations from the CPS addressed modifications 
affecting the existing type certification of airplanes in order to keep older airplanes 
operating safely; these design modifications also include upgrading airplanes with better 
systems and/or new technologies, such as avionics, autopilots, ballistic parachutes, and 
inflatable restraints.  These recommendations also addressed the maintenance of new 
parts or technologies that the original airplane manufacturer never envisioned being 
installed on their airplane (FAA, 2009, p. 30). 
The CPS also provided continued airworthiness recommendations that addressed 
the need to make safety related modifications more affordable and feasible, along with 
removing delays associated with the approval of modifications and alterations of certified 
airplanes.  The CPS also recommended the creation of policy to allow the use of accepted 
industry or government standards for the alteration or modification of a product, if the 
new standard exceeds the original standard created under the airplane’s  airworthiness  
certification (FAA, 2009, p. 42). 
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Part 23 Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC).  In August 2011, following 
the recommendations of the CPS, the FAA created a Part 23 Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee (ARC) (FAA, 2011b).  Tasking for the ARC included a re-write of the 
regulations on a broad, general, and progressive level and creating tiers based on airplane 
performance and complexity, as opposed to the existing weight and propulsion 
classifications.  In accordance with the recommendations from the CPS, the ARC was 
also tasked with modifying the required oversight for Part 23 products to be consistent 
with aircraft complexity (FAA, 2009, p. 15).   
The Part 23 ARC consisted of approximately 55 members including 
representatives from the FAA, European Aviation Safety Agency, National Civil 
Aviation Agency of Brazil, Civil Aviation Administration of China, Transport Canada, 
Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand, airplane manufacturers, avionics 
manufacturers, and industry groups.  The committee concluded their meetings in January 
2013, and they submitted their recommendations to the FAA in May, 2013 (Pompeo, 
2013). 
The main objectives of the ARC were to: (a) develop a performance-based 
approach to airworthiness standards for Part 23 airplanes, (b) set an international standard 
that advances the introduction of new technologies, (c) reduce fatal accidents by 50%, 
and (d) reduce certification costs also by 50% (FAA, 2011c). 
International standards that promote the introduction of new products are 
necessary in order to leverage the rapidly evolving technological advances.  A GA 
chapter has been created within ASTM (ASTM F44) to facilitate the adoption of 
international standards that will advance the introduction of new technologies (Clauson, 
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2012).  The FAA utilizes similar industry standards through policy and guidance 
documents.  Many of the Part 25 avionics and systems are approved using industry and 
government standards.  By taking some of the guidance out of the regulations and by 
setting high-level requirements that are implemented through industry and government 
standards, the FAA would have total control over the design requirements while 
maintaining flexibility and adaptability to address new product developments.  
Maximizing the use of acceptable industry standards also conforms with NTTAA and 
requires government agencies to make use of public standards wherever possible (FAA, 
2009). 
Problems and limitations of the current Part 23 certification process.  Part 23 
rules have evolved from the design standards created back in the 1920s.  As time 
progressed and as scientific knowledge was gained through continued investigation, 
experimentation, and accrued service histories, the certification regulations evolved into 
increasingly comprehensive rules to address safety issues, engineering advancements, 
airworthiness requirements, and the incorporation of new technologies.  While it is 
possible to modify existing aircraft using their original certification basis, the current 
rules do not address the installation or maintenance of new equipment that the original 
manufacturer never envisioned being installed on the airplane.  Consequently, the 
incorporation of new technologies into old aircraft that could potentially enhance safety 
has become very difficult and time consuming, as these changes would frequently require 
a rule change or a change in certification (Part 23 ARC, 2012). 
The current regulations are very prescriptive in nature and do not allow 
manufacturers to utilize alternative means of compliance or find more economical paths 
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to provide the acceptable levels of safety.  An AC is relied upon to provide interpretations 
of the regulations as well as a means of compliance.  In practice, following the guidance 
presented in ACs has been the easiest path to obtaining certification approval, or in some 
cases, this guidance has been treated as the only acceptable mode of compliance, which 
again precludes manufacturers from proposing a simplified method of compliance 
intended to show equivalent safety more economically (Part 23 ARC, 2012).  In addition, 
the interpretation of the ACs and regulations could vary among Aircraft Certification 
Offices and Manufacturing Inspection District Offices.  Both the safety regulations within 
Part 23 and the ACs have historically been infrequently revised; therefore, advances in 
technology have outpaced the rate at which the guidance and the regulations within Part 
23 have been updated (Part 23 ARC, 2012).   
Most of the currently active aircraft in the lower tier of Part 23 were certified 
based on CAR 3 certification and would not be able to be certified under the current 
Part 23 rules without significant additional effort; yet, these aircraft have proven to 
provide an acceptable level of safety to continue operating over the last 50 to 60 years 
(Part 23 ARC, 2012).  Some of the older aircraft designs have been updated to meet 
Part 23 rules such as the newer Cessna 172 models that are still in production.  However, 
“A  consequence  of  the  difficult  regulatory  environment  has  been  the  high  cost  of  
certification and a corresponding reduction of new entry-level products  within  part  23”  
(FAA, 2009, p. 15).  Therefore, as of 2012, the average age of a four-seat airplane has 
increased to 42 years (GAMA, 2012).  Manufacturers and aircraft owners have found it 
difficult to introduce new safety enhancing technologies into older aircraft (Part 23 ARC, 
2012). 
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Part 23 relies on a system of overlapping ACs and, to a lesser extent, industry 
standards to establish safety requirements.  A large portion of these safety regulations 
prescribe design  solutions.    This  prescriptive  approach  has  limited  the  manufacturers’  
ability to implement new safety-enhancing and cost-reducing technologies due to the 
difficulty defining an acceptable means of compliance within the existing rules and 
guidance.  In order to improve the efficiency of the certification process, decrease the 
cost of certification, and allow for technological advances, the members of the Part 23 
Certification ARC have suggested the implementation of industry standards to separate 
the intent of the rule from the technical implementation requirements and means of 
compliance.  The intent of the rule would remain regulatory in the FARs, and the 
technical implementation requirements and means of compliance will be captured in 
industry standards and guidance documents (Part 23 ARC, 2012). 
Experimental-Amateur Built airplane category growth and accident rate.  In 
2013, E-AB airplanes represent the fastest growing type of aircraft in the GA fleet (FAA, 
2013a).  In 2011, there were approximately 33,000 registered E-AB aircraft, a 10% 
increase from 2008.  From 2009 through 2011, E-AB aircraft accounted for 14% of 
airplanes in nonfatal GA accidents and approximately 21% of airplanes in fatal accidents.  
In 2009, accident data indicated that experimental airplanes were involved in 
approximately 27% of fatal accidents in the U.S., yet only accounted for 3.4% of the total 
GA fleet hours (FAA, 2011a).   
In 2012, the NTSB completed a safety study of E-AB aircraft.  Among other 
findings, the NTSB concluded that the first 50 hours of flight, known as the flight test 
period for E-AB airplanes, are uniquely challenging for most pilots.  During the first 
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50 hours of flight, the pilot must learn to manage the handling characteristics of an 
unfamiliar airplane as well as the challenges of the flight test environment, in many cases 
without having received any previous formal flight test training.  Some of the most 
common difficulties encountered during flight testing include: instrumentation that is not 
yet calibrated, controls that may need adjustments, possible malfunctions, or adverse 
handling characteristics (NTSB, 2012b). 
According to the NTSB study, power-plant failures and loss of control in flight 
are the most common E-AB aircraft accident occurrences, and structural failures have not 
been a common occurrence among E-AB aircraft.  In comparison with similar non E-AB 
aircraft, a much higher proportion of accidents involving E AB aircraft occur early in the 
operational life of the aircraft or shortly after being purchased by a subsequent owner.  
The study also indicates that the majority of E-AB aircraft are now built from commercial 
kits, rather than from purchased plans or original designs (NTSB, 2012b).  The study also 
indicated that pilots of E-AB aircraft, have similar, or higher, levels of total aviation 
experience than pilots of non-E-AB aircraft engaged in similar GA operations; however, 
pilots of E-AB accident aircraft, on average, had considerably less flight experience in 
the type of E-AB aircraft.  E-AB aircraft are not allowed to be operated for compensation 
or hire, which includes flight instruction; therefore, finding suitable E-AB aircraft and 
instructors available for training is difficult and presents a barrier to pilots seeking 
transition training (NTSB, 2012b).  
The NTSB study also concluded that E-AB aircraft safety is largely managed by 
the community of E-AB aircraft builders, owners, and kit manufacturers rather than by 
FAA regulatory requirements; however, the FAA regulations mostly seek to ensure that 
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the majority work within the E-AB aircraft building process is done by the builder 
(NTSB, 2012b).  Airworthiness certificates are granted to the E-AB aircraft builder by 
the FAA based only on a review of documentation and a one-time inspection of the 
aircraft  after  it  has  been  completed.    Unlike  other  foreign  civil  aviation  authorities’  
requirements, the FAA has no requirement for pre-approval of the project or in-process 
inspections of materials and workmanship.  According to the NTSB (2012b), a large 
proportion of E-AB aircraft accidents involving loss of engine power could be reduced by 
requiring documentation of a functional test of the aircraft fuel system as part of the 
initial airworthiness certification. 
E-AB can be built from plans or unique designs, or they can also be built from 
commercially available kits of various levels of completion.  The FAA regulations 
however, require that the builder perform a minimum of 51% of the construction of an 
E-AB aircraft to qualify for a special airworthiness certificate (FAA, 2011a).  Every 
E-AB aircraft is different from one another, even aircraft completed from commercially 
available kits.  Since E-AB aircraft are unique; every early flight in the flight test phase 
constitutes an experiment (NTSB, 2012b).  On the other hand, in certified production 
airplanes, new models are usually evolutions of previous designs utilizing proven 
technologies (McClellan, 2013).  The flight test program for certified production 
airplanes is very structured with the support of very experienced flight test pilots, staff 
engineers, and flight test engineers who create a flight test program designed to minimize 
risks.  Certified airplanes have a pilot operating handbook that provides details about the 
aircraft’s  performance;;  systems;;  normal  and  emergency  operating  procedures;;  weight  and  
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balance; and any other information pertinent to the pilot.  On the contrary, E-AB aircraft 
have no pilot operating handbook (FAA, 2011a).   
FAR 91.319 (a)(2) prohibits the use of E-AB airplanes for hire, including flight 
instruction and rental;  therefore, receiving flight instruction in experimental aircraft is 
not always feasible (McClellan, 2013).  Alternatively, qualified Certified Flight 
Instructors (CFIs) with experience in certified airplanes are widely available.  One of the 
main advantages for people to acquire an E-AB, or convert a certified aircraft to the 
experimental category, is that one can make modifications to an aircraft without any 
coordination with the manufacturer (McClellan, 2013). 
Main causes of GA accidents.  According to the NTSB (2012a), in 2010, GA 
accidents accounted for 96% of all aviation accidents, 97% of fatal aviation accidents, 
and 96% of all fatalities for U.S. civil aviation.  In addition, GA accounted for 51% of the 
estimated total flight time of all U.S. civil aviation in 2010.  Figure 5 shows the total and 
fatal accidents for GA for the years from 2001 to 2010, including the experimental 
category.  These accidents do not include commercial aviation operations including 
Parts 121, 135, or 129 operations.  These figures also do not include air medical, 
sightseeing, or air tour operations, since these types of accidents were discussed 
separately in the NTSB report (2012a).   
The NTSB (2012a) report indicates that the number of GA accidents declined 
over the period of 2001 and 2010; however, the number of fatal accidents has remained 
steady over the same period of time.  Fatal accidents account for approximately 19% of 
total accidents in GA; this percentage has also remained relatively steady, ranging from 
17% to 20% between 2001 to 2010 (see Figure 5).  The accident rate for both fatal and 
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non-fatal accidents also remained relatively steady, as the number of hours flown have  
 
 
Figure 5.  Total and fatal GA accidents.  Adapted from Review of Aircraft Accident Data 
2010 by NTSB, 2012, p. 33. 
 
 
 
decreased during the same period of time.  Figure 6 shows the estimated total flight hours 
for GA based on the GA Survey, and Figure 7 shows the accident rate for GA.  One of 
the major limitations with GA activity data is that the number of hours flown per year and 
other activity information is obtained from the GA survey.  The GA survey collects 
voluntary  information  from  aircraft  owners  and  operators.    “The Federal Aviation 
Administration’s (FAA) survey of general aviation operators, on which the agency bases 
its annual flight-hour estimates, continues to suffer from methodological and conceptual 
limitations,  even  with  FAA’s  efforts  to  improve  it  over  the  years”  (GAO,  2012).  In order 
to maintain a more accurate count of the number of active aircraft, the FAA began 
requiring owners and operators of aircraft to renew aircraft registrations every three 
years, beginning in 2010.   
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Figure 6.  Estimated GA flight hours. Adapted from Review of Aircraft Accident Data 
2010 by NTSB, 2012a, p. 35. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Total  and  fatal  accident  rates  for  GA.  Adapted  from  “Review of aircraft 
accident  data  2010”  by  NTSB,  2012a, p. 36. 
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GA encompasses a wide range of operations and aircraft, from powered 
parachutes, gliders, and light sport aircraft, to turboprops and jets used for a variety of 
missions.  The majority of GA accidents in 2010 involved personal flying in fixed-wing 
airplanes, which accounted for 64% (912) of the total number of accidents; the second 
category of GA accidents was flight instruction in fixed-wing airplanes, which accounted 
for 10% (140) of the accidents (NTSB, 2012a).  Personal flying encompasses a wide 
variety of activities, from local currency flights to long distance cross countries.  
According to the NTSB (2012a), 78% of personal flying was conducted in fixed-wing, 
single-engine, piston airplanes.  In addition, the number of personal flying hours greatly 
decreased between 2003 and 2010 (see Figure 8), which coincides with the decrease in 
GA hours that were shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Estimated flight hours for personal flying. Adapted from Review of Aircraft 
Accident Data 2010 by NTSB, 2012a, p. 41. 
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In Stephens (2012), the FAA identified the top ten leading causes of fatal GA 
accidents to be (see Figure 9):  
1. loss of control in flight,  
2. controlled flight into terrain,  
3. system or component failure/power plant,  
4. low altitude operations,  
5. unknown or undetermined,  
6. other,  
7. fuel related,  
8. system component failure – non-powerplant,  
9. midair collisions, and  
10. wind shear or thunderstorm.   
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Top ten causes of GA fatal accidents. Adapted from Status of the GAJSC and 
development of the forensic data analysis process, by C. Stephens, 2012. 
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According to the FAA (2011a), from 2010 to 2012, fatal accidents from CFIT 
have been reduced by more than 50% compared to the previous three years.  Fatal 
accidents involving LOC in flight, during approach, and during landing have decreased 
20 to 25%.  Meanwhile, fatal accidents caused by bad weather have decreased by nearly 
40% in the past three years, and fatal accidents occurring at night decreased by about 
25%.  The FAA attributes these reductions in fatal accidents to the use of technology 
such as Global Positioning System (GPS) with moving maps and in-flight weather 
capabilities.  New technologies such as inflatable restraints, ballistic parachutes, data-link 
weather in the cockpit, Angle of Attack (AOA) indicators, traffic alert systems, and 
terrain avoidance equipment could continue reducing GA fatalities if these technologies 
are allowed to be implemented in certified airplanes.  The FAA is making an effort to 
facilitate the approval process of AOA indicators and seatbelts with airbags in order to 
allow all GA aircraft to be eligible for the installation of these devices (FAA, 2011a).   
In a further effort to reduce GA accidents, the GAJSC was formed in the mid-
1990s and is currently renewing its accident reduction efforts.  The GAJSC is a 
government and industry group that uses a data-driven, consensus-based approach to 
analyze safety data to develop specific interventions that will mitigate the root causes of 
accidents.  The group released recommendations to address LOC during approach and 
landing (GAJSC, 2012).  The report addresses the current Part 23 certification problems 
and emphasizes the importance of incorporating new technologies to prevent accidents.  
CFIT fatal accidents dropped 60% between 2001 and 2010; the GAJSC (2012) attributes 
that improvement to the use of electronic information such as GPS position on a moving 
map, real time weather, terrain awareness, and traffic awareness.  These electronic 
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devices have made a considerable contribution in the reduction of pilot workload.  The 
GAJSC (2012) also emphasizes that most of the safety enhancing technology that 
lowered the CFIT accident rate was in the form of handheld equipment not installed in 
the airplane, such as handheld GPSs and tablets.   
The GAJSC (2012) also recommended the use of AOA indicators and autopilots 
to prevent LOC accidents; however, these technologies, for the most part, must be 
installed in the airplane and are not available in the form of handheld equipment.  The 
high cost of certification and installation keeps these technologies out of small certified 
airplanes.  The report also states that the cost of installing an existing AOA system on a 
certified airplane is almost 10 times higher than installing the same system on an 
experimental airplane. 
According to the GAJSC (2012), LOC accidents at night and in Instrument 
Meteorological Conditions (IMC) would drop by 50% simply by installing autopilots in 
the more than 100,000 Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) capable GA airplanes.  Autopilots 
can be installed in experimental airplanes for as low as $2,500; however, installing an 
autopilot on a certified airplane could cost at least $10,000, which represents between 10 
to 50% of the average value of a GA airplane.  The GAJSC (2012) report also 
recommended that the FAA apply a risk management approach to analyze whether the 
current certification regulations are actually an obstacle to installing safety enhancing 
technology into the GA fleet. 
The Evolution of Airworthiness Certification Standards 
Airworthiness standards and the processes utilized to implement these standards 
are mandated by the federal government; these standards have evolved over the years 
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through legislative and regulatory changes.  These changes have been driven mainly by 
four areas: (a) public and congressional concern about air transportation safety, 
(b) introductions of new technologies, (c) lessons learned from accidents or incidents, and 
(d) he need for harmonization with international air transportation policies and 
regulations (CACSM, 1998). 
Airworthiness standards state that no person may lawfully operate a civil aircraft 
in the U.S. unless the aircraft has an airworthiness certificate.  The requirements for the 
certification of civil aircraft date back to the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (Komons, 1978).  
These regulations were codified in the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Air 
Commerce Aeronautics Bulletin No. 7 titled: Airworthiness Requirements for Aircraft by 
the Department of Commerce Bureau of Air Commerce (1926).  On March 29, 1927, the 
Department of Commerce Aeronautics Branch issued the first aircraft type certificate to 
the Buhl Airster CA-3.  In the late 1930s, the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) was 
established and a replacement for Bulletin No. 7 was issued.  The new regulation was the 
Civil Air Regulation (CAR) Part-4.  This regulation recognized the need for separate 
regulations for small aircraft and larger transport aircraft.  CAR Part 4 covered small 
aircraft, while CAR Part 4T covered transport aircraft.  Helicopters were later added to 
the certification regulations (Kimberlin, 2003).   
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 resulted in the issuance of new regulations: 
CAR 4A for small aircraft and CAR 4B for transport aircraft.  These designations were 
later changed to CAR Part 3 for small aircraft, defined as aircraft with a maximum 
certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or less, and CAR Part 4b for transport 
aircraft, defined as those aircraft with maximum certificated takeoff weight in excess of 
44 
 
12,500 pounds (Kimberlin, 2003).  Figure 10 illustrates the evolution of airworthiness 
regulations. 
 
Figure 10.  History and Evolution of Airworthiness Regulations. Adapted from: Flight 
Testing of Fixed-Wing Aircraft, by R. D. Kimberlin, 2003, p. 8, American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics. 
 
 
 
The FAA believes that the creators of CAR 3 selected 13,000 pounds as the 
weight division between what they considered the largest small airplane and the smallest 
large airplane (FAA, 2009).  Since 13,000 pounds was considered a number of bad luck, 
the creators of CAR 3 chose 12,500 instead.  The DC-3 was one of the large airplanes at 
the time, with a seating capacity of up to 13 passengers and a maximum certificated 
takeoff weight of 25,000 pounds; around the same time, the largest light twin-engine 
airplane was the Beech 18, which had a maximum certificated takeoff weight of about 
8,000 pounds.  Historically, smaller, lighter airplanes were typically simpler and slower, 
while larger and heavier airplanes were more complex and faster.  While splitting aircraft 
12,500 
12,500 
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categories based on weight had a logical foundation, one of the problems of aircraft 
certification is the wide spectrum of complexity of Part 23 airplanes: (a) ranging from 
slow single-engine airplanes to very fast jets, and (b) all with maximum certificated gross 
weights of 12,500 pounds or less (Bowles, 2010). 
Many of today's light aircraft and some transport aircraft are still certified using 
the CARs as their type certification regulatory basis if the manufacturer applied for the 
original type of certificate when these regulations were in effect (Kimberlin, 2003).  In 
1965, after the Civil Aeronautics Authority became the Federal Aviation Agency, new 
aircraft certification regulations were issued.  Aircraft with maximum certificated takeoff 
weights of 12,500 pounds and below were governed by 14 CFR Part 23, while  aircraft 
with maximum certificated takeoff weights in excess of 12,500 pounds  were governed 
by 14 CFR Part 25 (Part 25).  Initially, these rules were very similar to the CAR 3 rules; 
however, changes in technology and accidents have caused the rules to be revised and 
changed considerably. 
In the 1960s, the development of the jet engine allowed civilian jets to be 
produced.  The early civilian jets had a maximum certificated takeoff weight of over 
12,500 pounds, so they naturally fell within the CAR 4 or Part 25 transport category.  Bill 
Lear created the Learjet 23 and intentionally set the maximum certificated takeoff weight 
at  exactly  12,500  pounds  so  as  to  remain  in  the  Part  23  category.    Lear’s  intent  was  to  
simplify certification and save time.  Lear wanted the Learjet to be one of the first 
business jet in history and also wanted to complete the aircraft certification process 
before that of one of its competitors, the Jet Commander (Slocum, 1978).  The Lear 23 
was allowed to be certified under Part 23 with the exception that it was required to have a 
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crew of two pilots, a requirement that previously applied only to Part 25 airplanes.  The 
next Learjet model built was the Lear 24, which was almost identical to the Lear 23, but 
it was certified under Part 25 (Slocum, 1978).  In more modern times the Cessna Citation, 
which weighed much less than 12,500 pounds, because it was a jet, was certified under 
Part 25 and was required to have two pilots.  A few years later, Cessna built the Model 
501 Citation I-SP that was certified for single-pilot operations under Part 23; this airplane 
was almost identical to the Citation 500 (Slocum, 1978).   
In the 1970s, the 19 passenger turboprops, such as the Beech 1900 and the Merlin 
Metro, emerged on the market and started being used for airline feeder routes.  The FAA 
decided to use Part 23 certification standards for this new commuter class, supplementing 
many sections with Part 25 Special Federal Airworthiness Regulation (SFAR) 
requirements (FAA, 2009). 
Initially, the commuter class within Part 23 was reserved for airplanes already 
certified and in production; however, new business jets, like the Beech Premier and 
Citation CJ2 emerged.  These jets were built with maximum certificated takeoff weights 
of less than 12,500 pounds in order to remain under Part 23.  To certify other high-
performance jets such as the Citation CJ4 or the Embraer Phenom 300 under Part 23, the 
FAA created a new set of SFAR documents with the special conditions the airplanes had 
to meet.  These jets were required to meet the same engine failure minimum climb take-
off profile of the large jets, which is imposed as a special condition on those airplanes 
and did not extend to all airplanes in Part 23.  In 2006, the FAA certified the Eclipse 500 
very light jet.  Since the Eclipse 500 weighed less than 6,000 pounds, it was exempt from 
meeting the engine failure minimum climb performance.  The FAA allowed this 
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exception since propeller airplanes that weigh less than 6,000 pounds do not have engine-
out climb requirements (Eclipse Aviation Corporation [EAC], 2008). 
The special conditions necessary to fit high-performance jets into certification 
standards originally designed for piston single-engine and twin-engine airplanes resulted 
in rule changes catered to the certification of higher performance and more complex 
aircraft.  Between 1994 and 1996, approximately 800 rule changes to Part 23 were 
enacted.  The rule changes ranged from corrections, to harmonization with European 
rules, to rules that addressed new technologies.  While these changes addressed the needs 
of more sophisticated Part 23 airplanes, the overall certification complexity increased, 
making it more costly to certify less complex aircraft (FAA, 2009).  
The Aircraft Certification Process 
The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) contain the airworthiness standards and 
are contained separately in Chapter I of Title 14 of the CFR.  The FARs provide the type 
certification requirements or airworthiness standards.  These airworthiness standards 
include requirements for aircraft design, manufacturers’  production  quality  control  
systems, operations standards, and maintenance standards for air carriers and repair 
facilities (CACSM, 1998). 
The main goals of aircraft certification and continued airworthiness standards are: 
(a) to increase the reliability of safety-critical systems, and (b) to ensure that the 
probability of the failure for a particular safety-critical system is less than one in one 
billion for each flight hour.  The FAA has sought to achieve these goals through 
regulations that contains standards for design, analysis, tests, inspection, maintenance, 
and operations (CACSM, 1998).   
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The Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) is the department within the FAA that 
develops and administers safety standards for aircraft and related products manufactured 
in the U.S., or utilized by operators of U.S. registered aircraft.  The FARs administered 
by the AIR can be seen in Table 2.   
 
Table 2.  FARs Administered by the AIR. 
 
FAR Description 
FAR Part 21 Certification procedures for products and parts 
FAR Part 23 Airworthiness standards for normal, utility, aerobatic, and 
commuter category aircraft. 
 
FAR Part 25 Airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes 
FAR Part 27 Airworthiness standards for normal category rotorcraft 
FAR Part 29 Airworthiness standards for transport category rotorcraft 
FAR Part 33 Airworthiness standards for aircraft engines 
FAR Part 35 Airworthiness standards for propellers 
FAR Part 39 Airworthiness directives 
 
 
 
Aircraft certification regulations, Parts 21-39, are intended to ensure the 
airworthiness of aircraft by requiring the manufacturers of aircraft, engines, propellers, 
and any other component to comply with approved type designs.  Aircraft certification 
regulations also require the development of operations limitations and maintenance 
requirements (CACSM, 1998).  The AIR consists of six policy centers located at the FAA 
headquarters in Washington, DC and four directorates: (a) the Transport Airplane 
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Directorate in Seattle, Washington; (b) the Small Airplane Directorate in Kansas City, 
Missouri; (c) the Rotorcraft Directorate in Forth Worth, Texas; and (d) the Engine and 
Propeller Directorate in Burlington, Massachusetts. 
Each directorate is also assigned a geographic area that covers about one-fourth of 
the U.S. and designated areas overseas.  Within its assigned areas, each directorate is 
responsible for all the administrative aspects of aircraft certifications and continued 
airworthiness.  An infrastructure of Aircraft Certification Offices (ACOs) and 
Manufacturing  Inspection  District  Offices  (MIDOs)  are  assigned  to  each  directorate’s  
geographic area (CACSM, 1998).  The ACOs approve the design for all types of new 
aircraft, engines, and propellers; aircraft and system modifications; new materials; and 
spare parts.  MIDOs approve production certificates for manufacturers of all types of 
regulated products and oversee the production quality control systems (CACSM, 1998).  
Both the ACOs and the MIDOs have continued operational safety functions that involve 
participation in aircraft accidents and incidents, reviewing service difficulty reports, 
developing ADs, and enforcing regulations. 
Airworthiness certificates.  Airworthiness certificates are the cornerstones of 
AIR’s  overall  certification  process  (CACSM, 1998).  In order to receive an airworthiness 
certificate, the aircraft must conform to its FAA approved type design and be in safe 
operating condition.  The FAA issues standard and special airworthiness certificates.  
Special airworthiness certificates do not meet these international certification standards 
set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).  Special airworthiness 
certificates include the following categories: primary, restricted, limited, provisional, 
light-sport, experimental, and special flight permits (FAA, 2010a). 
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Type certificates.  The FAA grants approval of every new and modified design 
of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers through a type certificate.  The type 
certification process includes design approvals for materials, spare parts, and any other 
parts or equipment installed on a type-certificated aircrafts, engines, and propellers 
(CACSM, 1998).  The FAA grants approval of initial type designs of new products such 
as aircraft, engines, and propellers after the type of certification basis under 14 CFR 
21.17 has been established.  “The  certification basis identifies the applicable standards to 
which  the  Applicant  must  show  compliance”  (AIA,  GAMA & FAA, 2004, p. A2-40 ).  
The type certification basis includes applicable airworthiness standards in effect and may 
include special conditions.  These special conditions will have been developed to address 
novel and unusual design features of the product that are not specifically covered in the 
basic airworthiness standards.   
The type certification basis may be amended throughout the certification process; 
however, once the type certificate is issued, the type certificate basis becomes part of the 
type certificate and cannot be changed.  However, manufacturers may make design 
changes throughout the life of a particular product.  These changes are classified as either 
major or minor changes.  The FAA issues a Supplemental Type Certificates (STC) when 
an entity other than the manufacturer or holder of the type certificate has been approved 
to make a major change to a product in order to improve reliability, performance, or 
safety.  Other approval documents used for type certification include Technical Standard 
Order Authorizations (TSOAs) for the design of equipment, parts, materials, and Parts 
Manufacturing Approvals (PMAs) for the design of spare and replacement parts not 
included in the type certificate (CACSM, 1998). 
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Production certificates.  The FAA issues four different types of production 
approvals: production certificates, production inspection system letters, PMAs, and 
TSOAs.  Production certificates are issued for products that have already received a type 
certificate.  Production inspection system letters are similar to production certificates with 
the exception that they are issued to small manufacturers of aircraft, engines, and 
propellers (CACSM, 1998).  Each holder of a production approval is responsible for 
incorporating quality control systems and ensuring that all of the suppliers operate in 
accordance with the FAA approved production quality control system (CACSM, 1998). 
Continued airworthiness.  The FAA continuously monitors the safety 
performance of aircraft in service.  Airworthiness Directives (ADs) are issued by the 
FAA to prevent unsafe conditions that could arise while an aircraft is in service.  
Feedback from manufacturers, operators, pilots, mechanics, and from aircraft 
investigators, as well as recommendations from the NTSB are taken into account to 
determine when corrective actions are necessary (CACSM, 1998).  In some cases, public 
confidence, often manifested by political pressures, can become a factor in the decision 
making process.  As a result, ADs have been issued to restore public confidence even 
before a technical investigation has been concluded (CACSM, 1998).   
FAA delegation.  Historically, the FAA has relied on organizational and 
individual designee programs to meet its safety responsibilities and to provide timely 
services by leveraging limited resources (Aircraft Certification Process Review and 
Reform/Aviation Rulemaking Committee [ACPRR/ARC], 2012).  One type of individual 
designee is the Designated Engineering Representative (DER); DERs are non-FAA 
employees authorized to approve information related to aircraft structures, engines, 
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propellers, flight characteristics, systems, and equipment on behalf of the FAA.  Since 
1956, the FAA has developed various forms of organizational delegation.  In 2005, the 
FAA created the Organization Delegation Authorization (ODA) program.  The main 
purpose of the ODA program was to consolidate all the organizational delegations under 
the ODA umbrella and to standardize oversight (Department of Transportation [DOT], 
2011). 
Rulemaking process.  All regulations issued by a federal agency, including the 
FAA, must be disseminated through a public rulemaking process in accordance with the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  Rulemaking proposals may be triggered internally or 
externally.  External proposals may come from public petitions, NTSB recommendations, 
executive orders, or congressional statutes.  Internal proposals may arise from the Office 
of the Secretary of Transportation, the FAA Administrator, the Office of the Chief 
Counsel, or individual FAA offices such as AIR (CACSM, 1998).  After the need for a 
regulatory change is identified, a proposed rule change is developed and published in the 
form of a NPRM.  A comment period is then made available and public comments in 
response to the NPRM are evaluated; the final rule is then written, approved, published, 
and implemented.   
The NTTAA and the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-119  
The primary purpose of the NTTAA is to ensure that government agencies attain 
greater reliance on voluntary consensus standards developed by the private sector and to 
decrease the dependence on government-unique standards developed by, and for, the 
government (National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act, 1996).  The U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued the OMB Circular A-119 to establish 
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and disseminate policies (a) on Federal use and development of voluntary consensus 
standards, and (b) on conformity assessment activities consistent with NTTAA (Office of 
Budget and Management [OMB], 1998). 
Definition of standards.  OMB Circular A-119 defines the term standard as 
follows:  
a. The term "standard", or "technical standard" as cited in the Act 
[NTTAA], includes all of the following 
(1) Common and repeated use of rules, conditions, guidelines or 
characteristics for products or related processes and production 
methods, and related management systems practices.  
(2) The definition of terms; classification of components; 
delineation of procedures; specification of dimensions, materials, 
performance, designs, or operations; measurement of quality and 
quantity in describing materials, processes, products, systems, 
services, or practices; test methods and sampling procedures; or 
descriptions of fit and measurements of size or strength.  
b. The term "standard" does not include the following:  
(1) Professional standards of personal conduct.  
(2) Institutional codes of ethics. (OMB, 1998, para. 3)  
Industry consensus standards.  According to the OMB Circular A-119 with 
regard to NTTAA, voluntary consensus standards are: 
For purposes of this policy, "voluntary consensus standards" are standards 
developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, both domestic and 
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international. These standards include provisions requiring that owners of relevant 
intellectual property have agreed to make that intellectual property available on a 
non-discriminatory, royalty-free or reasonable royalty basis to all interested 
parties. For purposes of this Circular, "technical standards that are developed or 
adopted by voluntary consensus standard bodies" is an equivalent term. 
(1) "Voluntary consensus standards bodies" are domestic or international 
organizations which plan, develop, establish, or coordinate voluntary 
consensus standards using agreed-upon procedures. For purposes of this 
Circular, "voluntary, private sector, consensus standards bodies," as cited 
in Act, is an equivalent term. The Act and the Circular encourage the 
participation of federal representatives in these bodies to increase the 
likelihood that the standards they develop will meet both public and 
private sector needs. A voluntary consensus standards body is defined by 
the following attributes: 
(i) Openness. 
(ii) Balance of interest. 
(iii) Due process. 
(iv) An appeals process. 
(v) Consensus, which is defined as general agreement, but not 
necessarily unanimity, and includes a process for attempting to 
resolve objections by interested parties, as long as all comments 
have been fairly considered, each objector is advised of the 
disposition of his or her objection(s) and the reasons why, and the 
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consensus body members are given an opportunity to change their 
votes after reviewing the comments (OMB, 1998, para. 4).  
Consensus standards organizations.  Voluntary consensus standards bodies are 
domestic or international organizations that plan, develop, establish, or coordinate 
voluntary consensus standards using agreed-upon procedures (OMB, 1998).  Hundreds of 
these organizations are involved in the development of the standards utilized in the 
aerospace industry.  The main organizations involved in the development of aviation 
standards include: ASTM, Society of Aerospace Engineers (SAE), American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), American Society for Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME), Department of Defense (DoD), Electronic Industries Alliance/Government 
Electronics and Information Technology Association (EIA/GEIA), Institute of Electrical 
and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), Institute for Printed Circuits (IPC), International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), and AIA (AIA, 2005). 
Founded in 1898, ASTM has been recognized internationally as a leader in the 
development and delivery of international voluntary consensus standards.  These 
standards include and are not limited to aviation fuel standards, normal and utility aircraft 
electrical wiring systems, metallurgy, and LSA standards among many others (ASTM, 
2012).   
SAE’s  members  include  engineers, business executives, educators, and students 
from over 97 countries.  SAE holds hundreds of aerospace recommended practices and 
over 6,000 aerospace standards; these standards include and are not limited to aviation 
instruments, propulsion systems, wiring harnesses, and composite materials (AIA, 2005).   
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Standards for defense.  Military Specifications (Mil-specs) have been essential 
to the aerospace industry for over 50 years.  Mil-specs have not only supported the 
military aerospace industry, but they have also been utilized in commercial aviation.  The 
end of the cold war in the late 1980s and the reduction of defense budget prompted the 
U.S. government to reform military standards in 1994.  The Military Specifications 
Reform (MSR) mandated the review of about 29,000 military documents to eliminate the 
standards that were not in use and convert standards currently being utilized in the private 
sector (AIA, 2005).  MSR resulted in the inactivation of 8,100 Mil-specs and standards, 
the cancelation of 9,600 documents, and 3,500 Mil-specs being replaced by industry 
standards (AIA, 2005).  Procedures were established to create non-government standards 
to replace Mil-specs and the custody of the documents was moved to two main private 
sector standards developers: SAE and AIA. 
The future of aerospace standardization.  The aerospace industry is becoming a 
global industry with companies functioning as expanded international and collaborative 
partnerships (AIA, 2005).  However, the standards and the processes currently utilized in 
the aerospace industry are not positioned to support a global industry.  Increased costs 
associated with harmonization can result from a complex and often duplicative system 
that is not designed for a globalized environment (AIA, 2005).  In 2003, AIA established 
the Future of Aerospace Working Group (FAWG).  This group was tasked to examine the 
aerospace standardization system processes and organizations, to define standards 
systems necessary to support continued growth of the aerospace industry, and to provide 
recommendations to ensure an optimum standards infrastructure for the aerospace 
industry (AIA, 2005). 
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One of the main findings of the FAWG was that the aerospace standards systems 
are  in  danger  of  not  keeping  pace  with  the  industry’s  fast  growth.    The  working group 
concluded that the U.S. needs a national aerospace standardization body that is tasked 
with advocating, integrating, and facilitating the development and implementation of a 
global vision and strategy that supports the development and use of global aerospace 
standards (AIA, 2005).  The working group also recommended that standards and 
processes be developed so they serve the entire aerospace community and are used 
internationally throughout the industry.  These standards of choice for the global 
aerospace industry must be recognized internationally and global standards should be 
open for input from all stakeholders in the industry in accordance with standards set forth 
by the World Trade Organization (AIA, 2005). 
Summary 
Aircraft certification regulations are intended to promote the airworthiness of 
aircraft by requiring manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft owners to comply with 
approved aircraft designs, maintenance requirements, and operational limitations to 
increase the reliability of safety critical systems (CACSM, 1998).  Even though the 
implementation of strict certification requirements have created high standards for 
aircraft manufacturers, in the last three decades, new GA aircraft certification costs have 
increased, the number of GA aircraft produced has decreased, and there has been little 
change in operational safety or accident rates (Bowles, 2010).  The incorporation of new 
technologies into old aircraft that could potentially enhance safety has become very 
difficult and time consuming, as these changes would frequently require a rule change 
(Part 23 ARC, 2012).  New technologies such as inflatable restraints, ballistic parachutes, 
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data-link weather in the cockpit, angle of attack indicators, traffic alert systems, and 
terrain avoidance equipment could continue reducing GA fatalities if the technology 
becomes more available and affordable (FAA, 2009). 
In March, 1996, President Clinton signed Public Law 104-113, also known as the 
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA).  The primary 
purpose of the NTTAA is to ensure that government agencies attain greater reliance on 
voluntary consensus standards developed by the private sector and decrease the 
dependence on government-unique standards that were developed by, and for, the 
government (National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act, 1996).   
In 2004, the FAA initiated a test case with the certification of the new LSA 
aircraft, utilizing consensus standards (Bowles, 2010).  The American Society of Testing 
and Materials (ASTM) was chosen for the implementation and management of LSA 
consensus standards (ASTM, 2012).  Early indicators show that the LSA category has 
been a success; thus, the propagation of consensus standards to more mainstream uses has 
become an appealing option applicable to other segments of aviation (FAA, 2009). 
Part 23 rules have evolved from the initial set of design standards created back in 
the 1920s.  As time progressed, the certification regulations evolved into increasingly 
comprehensive rules to address safety issues that emerged with the growing number of 
aircraft in service, as well as the increasing complexity due to incorporation of new 
technologies.  However, these new rules were applicable to new aircraft entering the 
market and to any modification or alteration of an existing airplane (Part 23 ARC, 2012). 
The current regulations are very prescriptive in nature and do not allow 
manufacturers to utilize alternative means of compliance or find more economical paths 
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to provide the acceptable levels of safety.  An Advisory Circular (AC) is relied upon to 
provide interpretations of the regulations as well as a means of compliance.  The 
interpretation of the ACs and regulations could vary among Aircraft Certification Offices 
and Manufacturing Inspection District Offices.  Both the safety regulations within Part 23 
as well as the ACs have historically been revised infrequently; therefore, advances in 
technology have outpaced the rate at which the guidance and the regulations within 
Part 23 have been updated (Part 23 ARC, 2012).   
Most active aircraft in the lower tier of Part 23 were certified based on CAR 3 
certification and would not be able to be certified under the current Part 23 rules without 
significant additional effort; yet, these aircraft have proven to provide an acceptable level 
of safety to continue operating over the last 50 to 60 years.  As of 2012, the average age 
of a four-seat airplane has increased to 42 years (GAMA, 2012) and manufacturers have 
had difficulties introducing new safety enhancing technologies into old aircraft (Part 23 
ARC, 2012). 
In 2009, the FAA began a Part 23 CPS to assess the adequacy of the current 
airworthiness standards (FAA, 2011b).  In August 2011, following the recommendations 
of the CPS, the FAA created a Part 23 ARC.  The CPS recommended the reorganization 
of Part 23 and the creation of tiers based on airplane performance and complexity as 
opposed to the existing weight and propulsion classifications.  The CPS also 
recommended that certification requirements for Part 23 airplanes be written on a broad 
general and progressive level of tiers based on complexity and with a level of regulatory 
oversight that is consistent with this classification (FAA, 2009).   
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On May 7, 2013, a bipartisan group of U.S. House of Representatives members 
lead by Congressman Mike Pompeo, introduced the Small Aircraft Revitalization Act of 
2013.  This bill aims to establish a deadline for the implementation of the Part 23 ARC 
recommendations (General Aviation Revitalization Act, 2013).  According to Pompeo 
(2013):  “This legislation will improve safety, decrease costs, and free private-sector 
innovation to revitalize this important industry (p. 1).” 
In 2013, E-AB airplanes represent the fastest growing type of aircraft in the GA 
fleet (FAA, 2013a).  In 2011, there were approximately 33,000 registered E-AB aircraft, 
a 10% increase from 2008.  As of 2010, E-AB accounted for 10% of the GA fleet, but 
27% of the GA accidents.  From 2009 through 2011, E-AB aircraft accounted for 14% of 
airplanes in nonfatal GA accidents and approximately 21% in fatal accidents.  In 2012, 
the NTSB completed a safety study of E-AB aircraft.  Among other findings, the NTSB 
concluded that many of the accidents involving E-AB airplanes occurred in the first 50 
hours of flight (NTSB, 2012b). 
According to the NTSB (2012a), in 2010, GA accidents accounted for 96% of all 
aviation accidents and fatalities for U.S. civil aviation.  The NTSB (2012a) report 
indicates that the number of GA accidents declined over the period of 2001 and 2010; 
however, the accident rate for both fatal and non-fatal accidents also remained relatively 
steady, because the number of hours flown have decreased during this period of time.   
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The top three causes of fatal GA accidents are of interest to this study:  
1. loss of control in flight,  
2. controlled flight into terrain, and 
3. system or component failure/power plant (Stephens, 2012). 
According to the FAA (2011a), from 2010 to 2012, fatal accidents from 
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) have been reduced by more than 50% compared to 
the previous three years.  Fatal accidents involving Loss of Control (LOC) in flight, 
during approach, and during landing have decreased 20 to 25%.  The GAJSC attributes 
these reductions in fatal accidents to the use of handheld technologies such as GPS with 
moving maps that contain terrain, traffic information and in-flight weather capabilities 
(GAJSC, 2012).  New technologies such as inflatable restraints, ballistic parachutes, data-
link weather in the cockpit, Angle of Attack (AOA) indicators, traffic alert systems, and 
terrain avoidance equipment could continue reducing GA fatalities if these technologies 
are allowed to be implemented in certified airplanes (GAJSC, 2012).   
According to the GAJSC, LOC accidents at night and in IMC would drop by 50% 
simply by installing autopilots in the more than 100,000 Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) 
capable GA airplanes.  Autopilots can be installed in experimental airplanes for as low as 
$2,500; however, installing an autopilot on a certified airplane could cost at least 
$10,000, which represents between 10 to 50% of the average value of a GA airplane.  
The GAJSC (2012) report also recommended that the FAA apply a risk management 
approach to analyze whether the current certification regulations are actually an obstacle 
to installing safety enhancing technology into the GA fleet. 
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In order to improve the efficiency of the certification process, decrease the cost of 
certification, and allow for technological advances, the members of the Part 23 
Certification ARC have suggested the implementation of industry standards.  The 
utilization of industry consensu standards has the potential of making the certification 
approval process and the implementation of new technologies faster and more efficient 
by separating the intent of the rule from the technical implementation requirements and 
means of compliance (Part 23 ARC, 2012). 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Based on the literature review, the study focused on analyzing GA accidents 
involving fixed-wing, single-engine, reciprocating-piston for the following reasons: 
(a) piston airplanes account for 67% of the total civil aircraft population, (b) the number 
of piston airplanes manufactured annually has been decreasing substantially over the last 
ten years, (c) 64% of GA accidents involved personal flying in fixed-wing airplanes, 
(d) 78% of personal flying was conducted in fixed-wing single-engine piston airplanes, 
and (e) entry-level airplanes have been identified by the FAA as being the most affected 
by the increased difficulty and cost of certification.   
The research concentrated on comparing airplane accidents based on 
airworthiness certification.  The airworthiness categories utilized in the study were 
Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA, E-LSA, and E-AB.  The time period selected for the accident 
occurrences was between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2011 so as to include the 
LSA category that was created in 2004.  The accident causes considered were: 
x LOC 
x CFIT 
x Engine Failure  
x Structural failure 
Research Approach 
The study employed a mixed methods analysis that used an explanatory 
sequential design consisting of two phases (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009).  The first phase 
was composed of the  collection  and  analysis  of  quantitative  data  to  address  the  study’s  
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hypotheses.  The second phase consisted of the analysis of the qualitative data from the 
narrative section of the accident investigation reports utilizing text mining techniques.   
Design and procedures.  The primary purpose of aircraft certification is to 
maximize safety by minimizing the number of accidents.  Accidents involving the top 
three causes of accidents in GA (LOC, CFIT, and Engine Failure) were analyzed and 
compared based on aircraft airworthiness certification basis.  In addition, accidents due to 
Structural Failure were also analyzed, as this is one of the failures or malfunctions that 
aircraft certification is designed to prevent.   
The research focused on the overarching hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference in the frequency of accidents or in the accident rate among airplanes certified 
under Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA, E-LSA, or E-AB categories in which LOC, CFIT, Engine 
Failure, or Structural Failure was listed as a cause in the period between January 1, 2004 
and December 31, 2011. 
The quantitative portion of the study consisted of two parts.  In the first part, a 
Chi-Square statistical test was conducted to compare the frequencies of accidents among 
airplanes certified under Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, 
Engine Failure, or Structural Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.  If the 
Chi-Square test value had a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), the null hypothesis 
would be rejected.  In the second part, an ANCOVA statistical test was utilized to 
compare the accident rates among airplanes certified under Part 23/CAR 3, 
S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural Failure was 
listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.  If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test had a 
probability of less than .05 (p < .05), then the null hypothesis would be rejected. 
65 
 
For the ANCOVA statistical test, the dependent variable used was accident rate.  
The accident rate was calculated by dividing the number of accidents per year for each of 
the aircraft airworthiness categories by the number of hours flown per year for each 
category; these data were obtained from the GA activity survey, shown in Table 3 
(GAMA, 2012).  The fixed factor or independent variable used was airworthiness 
certification basis.  In order to account for pilot experience, design stage of the airplane, 
and age of the airplane, the  number  of  hours  on  the  airplane’s  airframe and the number of 
hours of total flight time of the pilot were used as covariates.  Covariates are not part of 
the dependent or independent variables, but have the potential to have an influence on the 
dependent variable (Field, 2009).   
 Following the quantitative analysis, the qualitative portion of the study consisted 
of the analysis of the narrative cause section of the NTSB reports for accidents in which 
LOC was listed as a cause.  LOC accidents are of special interest because they are the 
main cause of GA accidents (Stephens, 2012).  LOC is of particular interest to the FAA 
as it relates to aircraft certification because the GAJSC (2012) recommended the use of 
AOA indicators and autopilots to prevent LOC accidents; however, these technologies, 
for the most part, must be installed in the airplane and are not available in the form of 
handheld equipment.  The high cost of certification and installation deters airplane 
owners and operators from incorporating these technologies in small GA airplanes.  The 
GAJSC (2012) also stated that the cost of installing an existing AOA system on a 
certified airplane is almost 10 times higher than installing the same system on an 
experimental airplane. 
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Table 3.  Number of Aircraft and Hours Flown by Airworthiness Certification Basis. 
 
Year Certification Basis Hours Flown Number of Active Airplanes 
2004 Part 23 15,363,000 146,613 
2004 LSA (start of category) 0 0 
2004 E-AB 990,000 19,165 
2005 Part 23 13,739,000 148,101 
2005 LSA 9,000 170 
2005 E-AB 987,000 19,817 
2006 Part 23 13,976,000 145,036 
2006 LSA 66,000 1,273 
2006 E-AB 899,000 19,316 
2007 Part 23 13,571,000 147,569 
2007 LSA 260,000 6,066 
2007 E-AB 896,000 19,538 
2008 Part 23 12,746,000 145,497 
2008 LSA 293,000 6,811 
2008 E-AB 872,000 19,767 
2009 Part 23 11,730,000 140,649 
2009 LSA 286,000 6,547 
2009 E-AB 983,000 20,794 
2010 Part 23 12,151,000 139,519 
2010 LSA 311,000 6,528 
2010 E-AB 911,000 21,270 
2011 Part 23 13,574,031 184,706 
2011 LSA 356,539 8,967 
2011 E-AB 854,719 29,180 
Note.  Adapted from General Aviation Statistical Databook and Industry Outlook, by 
GAMA, 2012. 
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Text mining techniques were used to analyze the qualitative portion of the NTSB 
accident reports, more specifically the narrative cause section.  These narratives consisted 
of a few sentences or a few paragraphs of text depending on the complexity and nature of 
the accident.  The information in the narrative cause section can vary within the database 
as (a) different reporters may include various levels of detail, and (b) different causes and 
factors leading to the accident are confined within the narrative.  Text mining can help 
identify sets of related words from the narrative cause portion of the report; it can also 
identify clusters of similar circumstances, possible patterns, and relationships among 
accidents (Nisbet, Elder, & Miner, 2009).  
Apparatus and materials.  Accident data from the NTSB aircraft accident 
database was used for the study.  The NTSB database provides information about the 
type of aircraft airworthiness certificate.  The NTSB variables employed for the study 
were: Light-Sport Special Category (LTSP), Special Category Experimental (SPE), 
Standard Acrobatic Category (STA), Standard Normal Category (STN), and Standard 
Utility Category (STU).  The types of aircraft certification not considered in this study 
but included in the NTSB database are: Special Category Limited (SPL), Special 
Category Restricted (SPR), Special Flight (SPS), Special Provisional (SPV), Special 
Transport (STT), and Unknown (UNK) (NTSB, 2013).  The LSA airplanes were 
manually grouped into S-LSA and E-LSA utilizing information from the FAA type 
certificate database.  Airplanes in the Normal, Utility, and Aerobatic categories were 
grouped into either Part 23 or CAR 3, based on the basis of certification; this information 
was also obtained from the FAA type certificate database for fixed-wing, single-engine, 
reciprocating-piston (FAA, 2013b).  
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Population and Sample 
The population for the study consisted of all U.S. fixed-wing, single-engine, 
reciprocating-piston airplanes with maximum certificated takeoff weights of less than 
12,500 pounds.  The sample consisted of accidents of single-engine piston fixed-wing 
airplanes with maximum certificated takeoff weights of less than 12,500 pounds in the 
time period between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2011.  The airworthiness 
certification categories used for the study were: (a) standard category, which also 
includes normal, utility, and aerobatic; (b) LSA; and (c) amateur-built airplanes within 
the experimental category.  The airworthiness categories excluded from the sample were 
limited, restricted, special flight, provisional, transport, and unknown.  The start of the 
time period selected was based on the creation of the LSA category in 2004; the end of 
the time period selected was based on the availability of NTSB accident reports with a 
probable cause. 
Sources of the Data 
The sources of data to obtain the airplane accident information were (a) a public 
accessible NTSB accident database available online in Microsoft Access® format, and 
(b) the FAA type certificate database.  The FAA type certificate database was used to 
determine the aircraft certification basis. 
Data Collection 
The information required for the study was acquired from the NTSB Microsoft 
Access database and a Microsoft Excel® spreadsheet was created.  Additional fields of 
information for airworthiness certification basis such as S-LSA, E-LSA, Part 23, CAR 3, 
or E-AB airplanes were manually completed utilizing information from the FAA type 
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certificate database.  The spreadsheet was then exported into statistical analysis software, 
(Statistical Product and Service Solutions) SPSS 18® in which the data was analyzed.  
The qualitative data for the study was extracted from the narrative cause section of the 
NTSB accident investigation reports for LOC accidents.  Data mining was performed to 
analyze the qualitative portion of the NTSB accident reports employing 
STATISTICA 12® software. 
Reliability.  Reliability refers to the ability to obtain consistent and repeatable 
results.  The use of NTSB and FAA data assumes the data are reliable; however, caution 
was used when combining the information from the two sources of intended use: FAA 
and NTSB. 
Reliability was insured by employing consistent criteria for sampling and for 
classifying the various causes of the accidents.  In some cases, accident reports do not 
clearly state the primary accident cause.  In other cases there may be multiple causes 
stated for any given accident.   
One of the major limitations with accident rate data for GA is that the number of 
hours flown per year information is obtained from the GA survey.  The GA survey 
collects voluntary information from aircraft owners and operators.  In 2010, the FAA 
began requiring owners and operators of aircraft to renew aircraft registrations every 
three years to maintain a more accurate count of the number of active aircraft.  In order to 
test reliability in this study, a series of ANCOVA tests was performed utilizing an 
alternative accident rate calculated by dividing the number of accidents per year by the 
number of active aircraft that year for each aircraft certification category.  These results 
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were compared to the results obtained in the first ANCOVA test utilizing accident rate 
using hours flown per year for each category to verify consistency. 
Validity.  Validity concerns for this study will most likely fall into three sub-
categories: (a) content, (b) construct, and (c) predictive.  Each sub-category will 
contribute to the overall validity of the study.   
Content validity was established by properly selecting the sample group.  Since 
the LSA category is limited to single-engine reciprocating airplanes, the study 
constrained the aircraft selection to fixed-wing, single-engine, reciprocating-piston, in 
order to ensure that the data were comparable.  The LSA category was introduced in 
2004; however, airplanes and airplane accidents involving the LSA category did not 
begin until 2005, the date range between 2004 and 2011 was selected to include a time 
period in which the LSA category was available. 
Construct validity was established by utilizing the same criteria to determine the 
cause of the accidents.  The NTSB database contains, in many cases, more than one 
probable cause for each accident.  The main causes of interest were LOC, CFIT, Engine 
Failure, and Structural Failure.  If any of these causes appeared in the NTSB Occurrences 
variable (see Table 4 for Occurrences codes), then the main cause was listed as (a) LOC, 
(b) CFIT, (c) Engine Failure, (d) Structural Failure, or (e) Other.  If there was more than 
one of these causes for the same accident, the first cause in chronological order was 
selected.   
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Table 4.  NTSB Occurrences Codes. 
 
NTSB 
Codes 
NTSB Description Common Name 
250 LOSS OF CONTROL - IN FLIGHT LOC 
220 IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH OBJECT CFIT 
350 LOSS OF ENGINE POWER Engine Failure 
130 AIRFRAME/COMPONENT/SYSTEM 
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION (including in-flight 
breakup) 
Structural Failure 
Note.  NTSB codes found on the Occurrences table/Occurrence code Adapted from 
“Aviation  Accident  Database,”  by  NTSB,  2013. 
 
 
 
Predictive validity could be affected by airplane age, airplane design stage, and pilot 
experience.  Since the study compared Part 23 airplanes that were most likely older than 
LSA airplanes, airplane age could be a confounding variable that might influence 
Structural Failure and component failure due to crack propagation in older airplanes, 
stress cycles, accumulation of local damage, repairs, etc.  For design stage, Part 23 
aircraft have mature designs as opposed to LSA aircraft that, in some cases, have new 
and unproven designs.  In order to account for design stage of an airplane and age of the 
airplane, the  number  of  hours  on  the  airplane’s  airframe was used as a covariate in the 
ANCOVA test.  Another possible confounding variable is pilot experience.  To account 
for pilot experience, the total flight time of the pilot was used as a covariate in the 
ANCOVA test. 
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The threats to internal validity can be minimized by selecting a large sample size 
and a proven method.  Threats to external validity can be minimized by selecting a 
sample that is representative of the target population (Gliner, Morgan & Leech, 2009). 
Threats to external validity could affect the ability to generalize the results to the entire 
population.  Since the study employed a purposeful sample, the ability to generalize to 
the entire population could be reduced; however, the intent of the study was not to 
generalize to Part 25 aircraft (transport category airplanes), but to generalize to fixed-
wing, single-engine, reciprocating-piston airplanes under 12,500 pounds.  According to 
Shaddish, Cook, and Campbell (2001), using purposive sampling of heterogeneous 
instances benefits external validity in two ways: (a) to allow "tests of the interaction 
between the causal relationship and [variable] in the study," and (b) ".... sometimes 
sample sizes are so small that responsible tests of interactions cannot be done, and in any 
case there will be many potential moderators that the experimenter does not think to test.  
In these cases, heterogeneous sample sampling still has the benefit of demonstrating that 
a main effect for treatment occurs despite the heterogeneity in the sample" (p. 92).  In this 
study, a small sample size will not be of concern because the estimated purposive 
heterogeneous sample consisted of nearly 6,500 accidents.  
Treatment of the Data   
The NTSB aircraft accident database consists of a series of tables in Microsoft 
Access with an event identification number being the key variable among tables.  Eight 
tables were merged in order to access all of the information necessary.  A macro with 
queries was set up in Microsoft Access to filter the data needed.  Table 5 indicates the  
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Table 5.  Variables Utilized in the Study. 
 
NTSB Variable Name Variable Description Access Table Name 
ev_id Event identification number aircraft 
Regis_no Aircraft registration number aircraft 
Ntsb_no NTSB accident number aircraft 
damage Type of damage aircraft 
Acft_make Aircraft make aircraft 
Acft_model Aircraft model aircraft 
Cert_max_gr_wt Maximum certificated gross weight aircraft 
Homebuilt Is the airplane homebuilt? aircraft 
Total_seats Total number of seats aircraft 
fixed_retractable Fixed or retractable landing gear aircraft 
Afm_hrs Number of hours on airframe aircraft 
Acft_awy_cert Aircraft airworthiness certificate Dt_aircraft 
Crew_cert_code Crew certificate code Dt_flight_crew 
Crew_cert_instruct Flight instructor on-board? Dt_flight_crew 
Engine_type Type of engine engine 
Engine_mfgr Engine manufacturer engine 
Eng_model Engine model engine 
Power_units Units for engine power engine 
Hp_or_lbs Horse-power or pounds? engine 
Carb_fuel_injection Carbureted or fuel injected? engine 
Ev_type Type of event events 
Ev_year Year of event events 
Ev_month Month of event events 
Occurrence_code Occurrence code Event_sequence 
Occurrence_description Occurrence description Event_sequence 
Flight_hours Pilot total number of hours Flight_time 
Narr_cause Cause narrative narratives 
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tables and variables utilized for the analysis and the Microsoft Access table where the 
variables can be found within the NTSB database. 
Standard airworthiness category airplanes or airplanes certified under Part 23 or 
CAR 3 could fall under either of the following categories: Normal, Experimental, or 
Aerobatic; therefore, all three categories were combined.  The NTSB database does not 
differentiate between S-LSA and E-LSA; therefore, the specific LSA categorization 
information was entered manually from the information on the type certificate data sheet 
database.  The NTSB database does not differentiate between the different types of 
experimental airplanes; however, the database has an additional variable that 
differentiates among airplanes that are amateur built.  Therefore, to analyze E-AB 
airplanes, all Experimental category airplanes were selected and then the data was filtered 
to obtain Amateur-Built airplanes only.  The data was filtered to include Part 91 
operations, fixed-wing airplanes, maximum certificated gross weight under 12,500 
pounds, U.S. registered aircraft only, single-engine, and reciprocating.  The NTSB codes 
for the occurrences that were analyzed are shown in Table 4. 
Descriptive statistics.  Descriptive statistics constitute an essential part of the 
analysis in this study.  Some of the descriptive statistics that were utilized for the analysis 
include percentiles, frequencies, and graphs.  Table 6 lists the variables that were utilized 
and the type of descriptive statistics.   
Reliability testing.  Reliability refers to the ability of a measure to produce 
consistent results when some of the entities are measured under different conditions 
(Field, 2009).  In order to test reliability in this study, a series of ANCOVA statistical 
tests was performed utilizing an alternative accident rate calculated by dividing the  
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Table 6.  Variables Utilized for Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Type of Descriptive Statistics 
Mean, Median, Mode, Standard Deviation, Skewness, 
Kurtosis, Maximum, Minimum, Percentiles 
Frequencies 
Cert_max_gr_wt Acft_make 
Total_seats Acft_model 
Afm_hrs Homebuilt 
Flight_hours Acft_awy_cert 
 Crew_cert_code 
 Crew_cert_instruct 
 Engine_type 
 Engine_mfgr 
 Carb_fuel_injection 
 Ev_type 
 Ev_year 
 Ev_month 
 
 
 
number of accidents per year by the number of active aircraft that year for each aircraft 
certification category.  The results were compared to verify consistency of the results 
obtained in the first ANCOVA test utilizing accident rate using hours flown per year for 
each category.   
Hypothesis testing.  The purpose of this study was to analyze the frequency of GA 
airplane accidents and accident rates on the basis of aircraft certification to determine 
whether or not differences in aircraft certification rules had an influence on accidents.  
The certification categories examined were: Part 23, CAR 3, LSA, and E-AB.  The 
accident causes examined were those listed as: LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, and 
Structural Failure in the time period between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2011. 
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The hypotheses were: 
H01: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among 
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard 
to accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
If the Chi-Square test value had a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), then the 
null hypothesis would be rejected. 
H02: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among 
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard 
to accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
If the Chi-Square test value had a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), then the 
null hypothesis would be rejected. 
H03: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among 
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard 
to accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
If the Chi-Square test value had a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), then the 
null hypothesis would be rejected. 
H04: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among 
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard 
to accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
If the Chi-Square test value had a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), then the 
null hypothesis would be rejected. 
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H05: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes 
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to 
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test has a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), 
then the null hypothesis would be rejected. 
H06: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes 
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to 
accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test has a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), 
then the null hypothesis would be rejected. 
H07: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes 
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to 
accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test has a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), 
then the null hypothesis would be rejected. 
H08: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes 
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to 
accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. 
If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test has a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), 
then the null hypothesis would be rejected. 
Qualitative data.  The qualitative data for the study was extracted from the 
narrative cause section of the NTSB accident investigation reports.  The qualitative 
results helped explain the initial quantitative results (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009).  Text 
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mining techniques were utilized to help analyze the qualitative portion of the NTSB 
accident reports.   
The Text Mining function of the STATISTICA Data Mining Software was 
utilized to analyze the dataset.  This text mining function aids in the identification of the 
main words encountered in the document along with their frequency.  A variety of plots 
are available including a scree plot and a scatter plot.  The scree plot indicates the 
different dimensions and the percentage of the total variance.  The elbow or point of 
inflection of the scree plot indicates the words that appear most frequently.  The scatter 
plot allows for the identification of word groups or clusters. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the frequency of GA airplane accidents 
and accident rates on the basis of aircraft certification to determine whether or not 
differences in aircraft certification rules had an influence on accidents.  In addition, the 
narrative cause descriptions contained within the accident reports were analyzed to 
determine whether there were differences in the qualitative data for the different 
certification categories.  The certification categories examined were: Part 23, CAR 3, 
LSA, and E-AB.  The accident causes examined were those listed as: LOC, CFIT, Engine 
Failure, and Structural Failure in the time period between January 1, 2004, and December 
31, 2011. 
The population for the study consisted of all U.S. fixed-wing, single-engine, 
reciprocating-piston airplanes with maximum certificated takeoff weights of less than 
12,500 pounds.  The sample consisted of accidents of single-engine piston fixed-wing 
airplanes with maximum certificated takeoff weights of less than 12,500 pounds in the 
time period between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2011.  The airworthiness 
certification categories included in the sample were: (a) standard category, which also 
includes normal, utility and aerobatic; (b) LSA; and (c) amateur-built airplanes within the 
experimental category.  The airworthiness categories excluded from the sample were: 
limited, restricted, special flight, provisional, transport, and unknown.   
Treatment of the Data and Procedures 
The NTSB accident database was used for the study (NTSB, 2013).  A series of 
queries was performed in Microsoft Access in order to merge the tables needed for the 
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analysis.  One of the main challenges of merging the Access database tables was that 
many duplicates were created for the same record or event as each variable could have 
more than one option; for example, under pilot certificate, the pilot can have a private, 
instrument, and commercial certificate, which resulted in three records for the same 
accident.  The following tables were merged without any additional duplicates being 
created: (a) Aircraft, (b) Engines, (c) Events, and (d) Narratives.  Table 7 indicates the 
criteria utilized to merge the rest of the tables without creating duplicates.  
 
Table 7.  Criteria Utilized to Merge Access Database Tables. 
 
Variable Name Access Table Name Criteria 
Aft_awy_cert Dt_aircraft If STN, STU, or STA at the same time, 
then replace with STN and delete 
duplicate field- 
Crew_cert_code Dt_flight_crew Highest rating only, only one pilot 
Crew_cert_instructor Dt_flight_crew If more than one for the same event_id, 
then merge & separate with comma 
Occur_code event_sequence If more than one for the same event_id, 
then merge & separate with comma 
Occur_descr event_sequence If more than one for the same event_id, 
then merge & separate with comma 
Phase_no event_sequence If more than one for the same event_id, 
then merge & separate with comma - 
Finding_no findings If more than one for the same event_id, 
then merge & separate with comma 
Finding_description findings If more than one for the same event_id, 
then merge & separate with comma 
Flight_hours flight_time Use total flight time only (TOTL ALL) 
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The initial process of merging the required tables resulted in 6,583 unique 
records.  Two variables were created in order to satisfy the two criteria of major interest: 
certification basis and main cause of accident.  The NTSB variable for Aircraft 
Airworthiness Certificate Codes (Aft_awy_cert) was used to complete the new 
certification basis variable.  If Aft_awy_cert was STN (standard category), then these 
fields were manually completed as either Part 23 or CAR 3 by looking at the FAA type 
certificate datasheet.  If Aft_awy_cert was LTSP (light sport), then the certification field 
was manually completed as either S-LSA or E-LSA after verification with the FAA type 
certificate datasheet.  Records that were missing airworthiness information were 
manually completed by either examining the aircraft make and model and then the type 
certificate datasheet or by examining the registration number on the FAA aircraft 
certification database; a total of 278 records were manually completed.  Another 28 
additional records resulted in unknown certification basis, most of which belonged to 
unmanned vehicles or to airplanes with an aircraft certification basis that did not meet the 
original criteria such as experimental non-amateur built or restricted.  These records were 
not included in the analysis.  Airplanes certified under rules preceding CAR 3 
certification rules such as: Bulletin 7, Bulletin 7A, CAR 4, or CAR 4a were grouped 
under CAR 3 aircraft certification basis. 
The codes from the NTSB variable Occurrence Code (Occurrence_code) were 
used to begin completing the fields of the main cause of accident variable.  The main 
causes of interest were: LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural Failure.  If any of these 
causes appeared in the NTSB Occurrences variable (see Table 5 for Occurrence codes), 
then the main cause was listed as: (a) LOC, (b) CFIT, (c) Engine Failure, (d) Structural 
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Failure, or (e) Other.  If there was more than one of these causes for the same accident, 
for example in the case of Engine Failure and LOC for the same accident, then the first 
cause in chronological order was selected as listed in the NTSB database.  A cause was 
not stated for approximately 800 records.  For these, the narratives were manually 
examined to determine the cause and the cause was then entered into the data.  A total of 
6,455 accidents met the initial airworthiness certification criteria of this study.  The total 
number of accidents involving the accident causes of interest for this study was 3,023 
(see Table 8).  Only these 3,023 accidents were utilized for the analyses to address the 
hypotheses.  However, in some cases all of the accidents were utilized to obtain general 
information about all accidents involving the different airworthiness certification 
categories studied between 2004 and 2011 as shown in Tables 8 and 9.  At the end of the 
above described data collection process, there were no missing data for the aircraft 
airworthiness certification or accident cause fields.  For any other variable, only records 
that had no missing data were used.  Table 9 shows the frequency of accidents by cause 
and certification basis for all accidents that met the criteria of the study. 
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Table 8.  Frequency of Main Accident Cause for all Accidents from 2004-2011. 
 
Main Accident Cause Frequency 
 LOC 1,155 
CFIT 563 
Engine Failure 973 
Structural Failure 332 
Total for LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure & Structural Failure 3,023 
Other 3,432 
Grand Total 6,455 
 
 
 
Table 9.  Frequency of Accidents by Cause and Certification Basis for all Accidents from 
2004-2011. 
 
Cause/Cert. Basis CAR 3 Part 23 E-AB S-LSA E-LSA Total/Cause 
LOC 618 196 266 41 34 1,155 
CFIT 405 76 75 6 1 563 
Eng. Fail. 587 127 216 15 28 973 
Str.Fail. 176 51 91 11 3 332 
Total 1,786 450 648 73 66 3,023 
Other 2,258 588 467 78 41 3,432 
Total/ Cert. Basis 4,044 1,038 1,115 151 107 6,455 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 10.  Some information such as the 
number of hours on the airframe was missing for many NTSB accident reports; however, 
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this variable was not one of the critical variables utilized in the study.  Therefore, the 
average of the hours on the airframe per year was calculated with the available data and 
utilized as a covariate.   
 
Table 10.  Descriptive Statistics.   
 
 Certificated Weight Airframe Hours Pilot Hours No. of Seats 
Valid 3,023 2,571 2,951 2,994 
Missing 0 452 72 29 
Mean 2,271.98 3,260.46 2,929.62 3.23 
Median 2,300.00 2,740.00 961.00 4.00 
Mode 2,300 0 1,000 4 
SD 935.45 3,572.64 5,336.42 1.40 
Skewness 1.05 6.72 3.53 .51 
Kurtosis 6.23 133.42 15.20 -.29 
Min 388 0 0 1 
25 Percentile 1,600.00 601.00 334.00 2.00 
50 Percentile 2,300.00 2,740.00 961.00 4.00 
75 Percentile 2,900.00 4,598.00 2800.00 4.00 
Max. 12,000 89,118 55,000 11 
 
 
 
Table 11 provides information about the number of hours on the airframe and the 
pilot total flight time by certification category.  S-LSA, E-LSA, and E-AB airplanes are 
on average newer than Part 23 and CAR 3 airplanes.  The average pilot flight times did 
not differ substantially.  As expected, the CAR 3 airplanes average number on hours on 
the airframe was higher than the other categories because these airplanes are the oldest 
airplanes. 
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Table 11.  Descriptive Statistics for Airframe Hours and Pilot Hours by Aircraft 
Certification Categories. 
 
Cert. Basis Covariate Valid Min Max Mean SD 
CAR 3 Airframe Hours 1,541 25 89,118 3,884.00 3,758.65 
 Pilot Hours 1,749 0 55,000 3,041.09 5,601.17 
PART 23 Airframe Hours 408 3 12,616 2,272.62 2,089.72 
 Pilot Hours 445 0 49,800 2,535.31 4,624.89 
E-AB Airframe Hours 509 0 19,611 412.31 1,066.85 
 Pilot Hours 624 0 33,000 2,840.22 4,853.78 
E-LSA Airframe Hours 48 0 12,691 495.08 1,808.81 
 Pilot Hours 61 10 31,270 3,857.84 7,465.82 
S-LSA Airframe Hours 64 0 3,542 312.28 533.57 
 Pilot Hours 71 8 25,000 2,652.01 4,621.59 
 
 
 
Table 12 provides the frequency and type of pilot certificate, as well as whether 
there was an instructor on-board.  As Table 12 shows, 54% of the pilots in the sample had 
at least a private pilot certificate, 26% had a commercial certificate, and 10% had an 
ATP.  Only 0.2% or 5 accidents had unknown or missing information about the pilot 
certificate.  An instructor was on-board in 22% of the sample accidents.  Figure 11 
illustrates the frequency and percentage distribution of the pilot certificate type of the 
sample pilots. 
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Table 12.  Frequency of Pilot Certificate Type and Instructor On-board. 
 
Pilot Certificate Type Frequency Percent 
Private 1,639 54.2 
Commercial 787 26 
ATP 349 10.8 
Student 137 4.5 
None 59 2.0 
Sport 44 1.5 
Unknown 5 .2 
Recreational 2 .1 
Foreign 1 .0 
Total 3,023 100.0 
Instructor on-board Frequency Percent 
No 2,359 78 
Yes 664 22 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Frequency and percentage of pilot certificate type. 
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The extent of airplane damage, from None to Destroyed, is illustrated by the data 
of Table 13.  In 82% of the accidents, substantial damage occurred. 
 
Table 13.  Frequency of Aircraft Damage Type. 
 
Type of Damage Frequency Percent 
 Substantial 2,487 82.3 
 Destroyed 504 16.7 
Minor 22 .7 
None 10 .3 
Total 3,023 100.0 
 
 
 
The frequency of accidents by cause is displayed in Figure 12.  Airplanes certified 
under CAR 3 rules account for 53.5%, or 618 of the accidents in which LOC was listed 
as a cause between the period of January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2011.  Airplanes 
certified under CAR 3 rules also account for 62.65% of the total accidents within the 
same period. 
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Figure 12.  Frequency of accidents by cause and certification basis. 
 
 
 
The frequencies of accidents by month are displayed in Figure 13.  Not 
surprisingly, flight activity level increases during the summer months and as a result so 
does the accident frequency.  Even though the number of total accidents per year has 
decreased in the period between 2008 and 2011 (see Figure 14), the accident rates have 
remained relatively constant as the number of hours flown per year has decreased (see 
Figure 15). 
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Frequency of accidents by month. 
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Figure 14.  Frequency of accidents by year. 
 
 
 
The general trend of the rate of accidents by certification basis for Part 23/CAR 3 
certified airplanes has remained nearly constant, as shown in Figure 15.  The large spike 
in the accident rate for LSA can be attributed to the start of the category in 2004; 
production of LSA airplanes began in 2005 with only 3 accidents and 9,000 hours flown 
that year in the LSA category. 
 
 
Figure 15.  Accident rate by year and certification basis for study sample.  
Note: The accident rate is given in number of accidents per year per 100,000 hours. 
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Table 14 shows the frequency of accidents, number of active aircraft, hours 
flown, and accident rate by certification basis.  Figure16 shows the accident rate by 
accident cause and certification basis.  The accident rate for the LSA and E-AB 
categories for accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause is higher than for Part 23 
category airplanes, even though Part 23 airplanes account for 814 accidents in which 
LOC was listed as a cause and LSA airplanes were only involved in 75 accidents in 
which LOC was listed as a cause between the years of 2004 and 2011.  The higher 
accident rate for LSA airplanes is attributed to the much lower number of estimated hours 
flown during the same period.  The accident rates for Part 23 and LSA airplanes in which 
CFIT was listed as a cause are nearly equal. 
 
Table 14.  Frequency of Accidents, Active Airplanes, Hours Flown, and Accident Rate by 
Cause and Certification Basis for 2004-2011. 
 
Accident Cause Cert. Basis No. 
accidents 
Hours Flown 
 
No. Active 
Airplanes 
Accident 
Rate 
LOC PART 23/CAR 3 814 106,850,031 149,711 7.62E-06 
LSA 75 1,581,539 4,545 4.74E-05 
E-AB 266 7,392,719 21,106 3.60E-05 
CFIT PART 23/CAR 3 481 106,850,031 149,711 4.50E-06 
LSA 7 1,581,539 4,545 4.43E-06 
E-AB 75 7,392,719 21,106 1.01E-05 
Engine Failure PART 23/CAR 3 714 106,850,031 149,711 6.68E-06 
LSA 43 1,581,539 4,545 2.72E-05 
E-AB 187 7,392,719 21,106 2.53E-05 
Structural 
Failure 
PART 23/CAR 3 227 106,850,031 149,711 2.12E-06 
LSA 14 1,581,539 4,545 8.85E-06 
E-AB 113 7,392,719 21,106 1.53E-05 
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Figure 16.  Accident rate by accident cause and certification basis. 
Note: The accident rate is given in number of accidents per year per 100,000 hours. 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
The evaluation of eight hypotheses under investigation was conducted utilizing 
two main statistical methods: Chi-Square test and ANCOVA test.  Discussion of the 
statistical significance of the hypotheses follows. 
To address hypotheses one through four, Chi-Square tests were performed to 
determine whether the different causes of accidents were distributed differently across 
certification basis categories; therefore, the null hypotheses were: there is no significant 
difference in the frequency of accidents among airplanes certified under Part 23, CAR 3, 
S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural Failure was 
listed as a cause between the years of 2004 and 2011.  Since only the accident 
frequencies were utilized for the Chi-Square test, the amount of activity or number of 
active airplanes for each category was not taken into account.  The Chi-Square test 
compares the observed and expected frequencies; the test determines if the expected 
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values differ significantly from the observed values (George & Mallery, 2011).  The 
assumptions of the Chi-Square test were verified; these assumptions are: independence of 
observations and appropriate size of expected frequencies.  Initially, more than 20% of 
the cells had expected frequencies of less than five because the LSA category was new 
and few accidents occurred in 2004 and 2005.  To resolve the assumption violation, the 
S-LSA and E-LSA categories were grouped together and the data were grouped into 
two-year segments covering the period from 2004 to 2011.  For CFIT accidents, four 
cells or 25% of the expected counts had values of less than five; for LOC accidents, four 
cells or 25% of the expected counts had values of less than five.  The sample consisted of 
3,023 accidents; since the sample size was large the approximation of the Chi-Square 
distribution improves and the low expected counts are not as problematic (Field, 2009).   
The Chi-Square test indicated that there was a significant difference in the 
frequency of accidents in which LOC and Engine Failure was listed as a cause; there was 
no significant difference in the frequency of accidents in which CFIT or Structural 
Failure (see Table 15).  The Chi-Square test also indicated that there is a significant 
difference in the frequency of accidents among Part 23, CAR 3 and E-AB categories; 
however, the results indicated no significant difference in the frequency of accidents for 
the S-LSA/E-LSA category (see Appendix C1).   
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Table 15.  Chi-Square Test by Year and Accident Cause. 
 
Accident Cause 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
LOC 
H01 
Pearson Chi-Square 65.75 9 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1155   
CFIT 
H02 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.62 9 .055 
N of Valid Cases 563   
Engine Failure 
H03 
Pearson Chi-Square 31.34 9 .000 
N of Valid Cases 973   
Structural Failure 
H04 
Pearson Chi-Square 14.44 9 .108 
N of Valid Cases 332   
 
 
 
H01.  The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the 
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, 
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause from 
2004 to 2011.  The Chi-Square test result  was  χ2 = 65.75, df = 9, and p = .000; therefore, 
the null hypothesis was rejected.   
For CAR 3 airplanes, there were 618 LOC accidents between 2004 and 2011, 
with a decreasing trend of 105 accidents in 2004 to 59 accidents in 2011 that represents a 
43% decrease in seven years.  For CAR 3 airplanes, the standardized residual that fell 
outside of the ± 1.96 range was for the years 2004/2005 with a value of 2.4; the actual 
number of accidents were higher than the expected values for that period. 
For Part 23 airplanes, there were 196 LOC accidents between 2004 and 2011, 
with a decreasing trend of 28 accidents in 2004 to 19 accidents in 2011 that represents a 
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32% decrease in seven years.  For Part 23 airplanes, there were no standardized residuals 
that fell outside of ± 1.96 range.  
For E-AB airplanes, there were 266 LOC accidents between 2004 and 2011, with 
a decreasing trend of 41 accidents in 2004 to 19 accidents in 2011 that represents a 53% 
decrease in seven years.  For E-AB airplanes, there were no standardized residuals that 
fell outside of ± 1.96 range.  
As expected, there was an increase in LOC accidents for the S-LSA/E-LSA 
category from 0 accidents in 2004 to 18 accidents in 2011 with a total of 75 LOC 
accidents between 2004 and 2011.  For S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes, the standardized 
residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range were for the years 2004/2005 with a 
standardized residual value of -4.6, 2005/2006 with a standardized residual value of 2.1, 
and 2010/2011 with standardized residual value of 4.5; the negative value of the 
2004/2005 residual indicates that the actual number of accidents was lower than 
expected.  During 2005/2006 and 2010/2011, the actual number of accidents was higher 
than the expected.   
H02.  The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the 
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, 
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause from 
2004 to 2011.  The Chi-Square test result  was  χ2 = 16.62, df = 9, and p = .055; therefore, 
the null hypothesis failed to be rejected.  Even though the p value is very close to 0.05, 
the data shows that the cells that provided inputs into the Chi-Square value was for the 
S-LSA/E-LSA category because the category had fewer than expected accidents. 
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For CAR 3 airplanes, there were 405 CFIT accidents between 2004 and 2011, 
with a decreasing trend of 107 accidents in 2004 to 14 accidents in 2011 that represents 
an 86% decrease in seven years.  For CAR 3 airplanes, there were no standardized 
residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range.  
For Part 23 airplanes, there were 76 CFIT accidents between 2004 and 2011, with 
a decreasing trend of 12 accidents in 2004 to 3 accidents in 2011 that represents a 75% 
decrease in seven years.  For Part 23 airplanes, there were no standardized residuals that 
fell outside of ± 1.96 range.  
For E-AB airplanes, there were 75 CFIT accidents between 2004 and 2011, with a 
decreasing trend of 21 accidents in 2004 to 3 accidents in 2011 that represents an 85% 
decrease in seven years.  For E-AB airplanes, there were no standardized residuals that 
fell outside of ± 1.96 range.  
There were a total of seven CFIT accidents for the S-LSA/E-LSA between 2004 
and 2011.  For S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes, the standardized residual for the years 
2008/2009 fell outside of ± 1.96 range with a standardized residual value of 2.6; 
therefore, there were more accidents than expected. 
H03.  The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the 
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, 
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause 
from 2004 to 2011.  The Chi-Square test result  was  χ2 = 31.34, df = 9, and p = .000; 
therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.   
For CAR 3 airplanes, there were 587 Engine Failure accidents between 2004 and 
2011, with a decreasing trend of 81 accidents in 2004 to 76 accidents in 2011 that 
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represents a 6% decrease in seven years.  For CAR 3 airplanes, the standardized residual 
that fell outside of ± 1.96 range was for the years 2004/2005 with a standardized value of 
1.9; the actual number of accidents was higher than the expected values during this 
period.   
For Part 23 airplanes, there were 27 Engine Failure accidents between 2004 and 
2011, with an increasing trend of 8 accidents in 2004 to 24 accidents in 2011 that 
represents a 200% increase in seven years.  For Part 23 airplanes, there were no 
standardized residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range.  
For E-AB airplanes, there were 216 Engine Failure accidents between 2004 and 
2011, with an increasing trend of 21 accidents in 2004 to 35 accidents in 2011 that 
represents a 66% increase in seven years.  For E-AB airplanes, there were no 
standardized residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range.  
As expected, there was an increase in Engine Failure accidents for the 
S-LSA/E-LSA category from 0 accidents in 2004 to 8 accidents in 2011 with a total of 43 
Engine Failure accidents between 2004 and 2011.  For S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes, the 
standardized residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range were for the years 2004/2005 with 
a standardized residual value of -3.2, and 2010/2011 with a standardized residual value of 
2.6; the actual number of accidents during 2004/2005 were lower than expected and 
during 2010/2011 were higher than the expected.   
H04.  The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the 
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, 
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a 
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cause from 2004 to 2011.  The Chi-Square test result  was  χ2 = 14.44, df = 28, and 
p = .108; therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected.   
For CAR 3 airplanes, there were 34 Structural Failure accidents between 2004 
and 2011, with a decreasing trend of 34 accidents in 2004 to 12 accidents in 2011 that 
represents a 64% decrease in seven years.  For CAR 3 airplanes, there were no 
standardized residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range. 
For PART 23 airplanes, there were 51 Structural Failure accidents between 2004 
and 2011, with a decreasing trend of 10 accidents in 2004 to 1 accident in 2011 that 
represents a 90% decrease in seven years.  For Part 23 airplanes, there were no 
standardized residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range.  
For the E-AB airplanes, there were 91 Structural Failure accidents between 2004 
and 2011, with a increasing trend of 3 accidents in 2004 to 11 accidents in 2011 that 
represents a 266% increase in seven years.  For E-AB airplanes, there were no 
standardized residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range.  
There were a total of 14 Structural Failure accidents for the S-LSA/E-LSA 
between 2004 and 2011.  For S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes, the standardized residual that fell 
outside of ± 1.96 range was for the years 2004/2005 with a standardized value of -2.1; the 
actual number of accidents during 2004/2005 were lower than expected. 
To address hypotheses five through eight a series of one way factorial ANOVA 
statistical tests with covariates—ANCOVA—was performed.  The hypotheses attempted 
to determine whether there is a significant difference in the accident rates among 
airplanes certified under Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, 
Engine Failure, or Structural Failure was listed as a cause after controlling for pilot flight 
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time  and  number  of  hours  on  the  aircraft’s  airframe.    The  CAR 3 and Part 23 as well as 
the S-LSA and E-LSA categories were combined respectively for this analysis as the total 
hours per year used to calculate the accident rate were only available for the combined 
categories.  The following assumptions were verified: (a) independence of observations, 
(b) normal distribution of the dependent variable, (c) homogeneity of variances, and 
(d) linear relationship between the covariates and the dependent variable.  All the 
assumptions for the one-way factorial ANCOVA were met; however, the dependent 
variable (accident rate) was skewed to the right with a level of skewness of 2.42 and 
kurtosis of 6.11.  Therefore, it was not normally distributed.  The skewness to the right 
can be attributed to the fact that there are no negative accident rates.  The factorial 
ANCOVA analysis is robust against violations of the normality assumption of the 
dependent variable.  In order to meet the requirements of the ANCOVA test, it was 
necessary to segregate the data into two-year segments covering the period from 2004 to 
2011.  Therefore, the number of variables or levels were summarized to eight levels, four 
levels for the dependent variable and four levels for the independent variable.  These 
variables used in the ANCOVA test are shown in Appendices C2-C5. 
H05.  For accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause, the Levene’s  test  of  
equality of error variances, which tests the homogeneity of variances was not significant 
with p =.053; therefore, the assumption was met.  The null hypothesis tested was that 
there is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes certified in the 
Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB, with regard to accidents in which LOC was 
listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.  The main effect, aircraft certification basis, was not 
statistically significant with F(2, 3) = .71, p = .560.  Therefore, there was no significant 
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difference among aircraft accidents based on aircraft certification basis in accidents in 
which LOC was listed as a cause.  The interactions between pilot flight time and time on 
the airframe with aircraft certification basis were also not significant.  The F-statistic in 
the ANCOVA test had a probability greater than .05 (p = .560); therefore, the null 
hypothesis failed to be rejected (see Table 16).  
 
Table 16.  ANCOVA as  a  Function  of  Certification  Basis  with  Hours  on  the  Airplane’s  
Airframe and Pilot Total Flight Time as Covariates for LOC Accidents. 
 
Source df MS F Sig. 𝛈𝟐 eta 
Cert. Basis 2 1.90E-10 .71 .560 .32 .56 
Cert. Basis * pilot flt. time 3 3.86E-10 1.44 .386 .59 .77 
Cert. Basis * airframe time 3 7.52E-10 2.80 .210 .74 .86 
Error 3 2.69E-10     
 
 
 
H06.  For accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause, the  Levene’s test of 
equality of error variances, which tests the homogeneity of variances, was not significant 
with p = .097; therefore, the assumption was met.  The null hypothesis tested was that 
there is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes certified in the Part 
23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB, with regard to accidents in which CFIT was listed as 
a cause from 2004 to 2011.  For the main effect, certification basis F(2, 2) = 3.84, 
p = .207.  Therefore, there was no significant difference among aircraft accidents based 
certification policy in which CFIT was listed as a cause.  The interactions between pilot 
flight time and time on the airframe were also not significant.  The F-statistic in the 
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ANCOVA test had a probability greater than .05 (p = .207); therefore, the null hypothesis 
failed to be rejected (see Table 17).  
 
Table 17.  ANCOVA as  a  Function  of  Certification  Basis  with  Hours  on  the  Airplane’s  
Airframe and Pilot Total Flight Time as Covariates for CFIT Accidents. 
 
Source df MS F Sig. 𝛈𝟐 eta 
Cert. Basis 2 2.56E-11 3.84 .207 .79 .88 
Cert. Basis * pilot flt. time 3 5.33E-11 7.98 .113 .92 .95 
Cert. Basis * airframe time 3 .00 .00 1.000 .00 .00 
Error 2 6.68E-12     
 
 
 
H07.  For accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause, the  Levene’s  
test of equality of error variances, which tests the homogeneity of variances was not 
significant with p =.247; therefore, the assumption was met.  The null hypothesis tested 
was that there is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes certified in 
the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB, with regard to accidents in which Engine 
Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.  In this case, there was a significant 
difference in the accident rates among airplanes certified under Part 23/CAR 3, 
S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB in which engine failure was listed as a cause, F(2,3) =105.36, 
p =.002, eta = 0.99.  Therefore, there were significant differences in the accident rates 
among the different aircraft certification categories, and the effect size was large.  There 
was also a significant interaction between the effects of the number of total flight time of 
the pilot and on the number  of  hours  on  the  airplane’s  airframe (see Table 18).   
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Table 18.  ANCOVA as  a  Function  of  Certification  Basis  with  Hours  on  the  Airplane’s  
Airframe and Pilot Total Flight Time as Covariates for Engine Failure Accidents. 
 
Source df MS F Sig. 𝛈𝟐 eta 
Cert. Basis 2 2.123E-10 105.36 .002 .986 .99 
Cert. Basis * pilot flt. time 3 1.19E-10 59.21 .004 .983 .99 
Cert. Basis * airframe time 3 8.91E-11 44.24 .006 .978 .98 
Error 3 2.01E-12     
 
 
 
The estimated marginal means plot indicated that there was a large difference 
between E AB and Part 23/CAR 3 accident rates when engine failure was listed as a 
cause; however, there was not a large difference in the estimated marginal means 
between airplanes certified under S-LSA/E-LSA or Part 23/CAR 3.  The pairwise 
comparison confirmed that there was a significant difference between E-AB and 
Part 23/CAR 3 airplanes (p = .011), and between E-AB and S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes 
(p = .016); however, there was no significant difference between Part 23/CAR 3 and 
S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes (p = .424) with regards to the means of the accident rates in 
which Engine Failure was listed as a cause.  The estimated marginal means plot in 
Figure 17 displays the difference.  The F-statistic in the ANCOVA test had a probability 
lower than .05 (p = .002); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.   
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Figure 17.  Estimated marginal means plot for Part 23, E-AB, and LSA certified aircraft 
accident rate for Engine Failure accidents. 
 
 
 
H08.  For accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause, the  Levene’s  
test of equality of error variances, which tests the homogeneity of variances, was not 
significant with p =.081; therefore, the assumption was met.  The null hypothesis tested 
was that there is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes certified in 
the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB, with regard to accidents in which Structural 
Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.  For the main effect certification basis, 
F(2, 3) = 0, p = 1.00.  Therefore, there was no significant difference among aircraft 
accidents based certification policy in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause.  The 
interactions between pilot flight time and time on the airframe with aircraft certification 
basis were also not significant.  The F-statistic in the ANCOVA test had a probability 
greater than .05 (p= 1.00); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected (see 
Table 19). 
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Table 19.  ANCOVA as  a  Function  of  Certification  Basis  with  Hours  on  the  Airplane’s  
Airframe and Pilot Total Flight Time as Covariates for Structural Failure Accidents. 
 
Source df MS F Sig. ηଶ eta 
Cert. Basis 2 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 
Cert. Basis * pilot flt. time 3 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 
Cert. Basis * airframe time 3 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 
Error 3 1.57E-11     
 
 
 
Reliability Testing 
Reliability refers to the ability to obtain consistent and repeatable results.  
Reliability of this study was insured by employing consistent criteria for sampling and 
classification of the cause of the accident and certification basis for the different 
categories of aircraft.   
In order to test reliability in this study, a series of ANCOVA tests was performed 
utilizing an alternative accident rate calculated by dividing the number of accidents per 
year by the number of active aircraft that year for each aircraft certification category.  
The results were compared to verify consistency of the results obtained in the first 
ANCOVA test utilizing accident rate using hours flown per year for each category.   
The results using the alternative accident rate by number of active airplanes per 
year were consistent with the previous results utilizing accident rate calculated with 
number of hours flown per year.  The alternative ANCOVA results for LOC were: 
F(2, 3) = .71, p = .560, indicating that there was no significant difference among aircraft 
accidents based certification policy in which LOC was listed as a cause.  The interactions 
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between pilot flight time and time on the airframe with aircraft certification basis also 
were not significant.  The alternative ANCOVA results for CFIT were: F(2, 3) = 0, 
p = 1.00, indicating that there was no significant difference among aircraft accidents 
based certification policy in which CFIT was listed as a cause.  The interactions between 
pilot flight time and time on the airframe with aircraft certification basis were also not 
significant.  The alternative ANCOVA results for Engine Failure were: F(2, 3) = 105.36, 
p = .02, eta =.98; there was also a significant interaction between the effects of the 
number of total flight time of the pilot with F(3, 3) = 59.21; p = .04, eta =.98; the 
interaction  between  the  effects  of  the  number  of  hours  on  the  airplane’s  airframe  was  not  
significant.  The pairwise comparison confirmed that there was a significant difference 
between E-AB and Part 23/CAR 3 airplanes, and between E-AB and S-LSA/E-LSA 
airplanes; however, there was not a significant difference between Part 23/CAR 3 and S-
LSA/E-LSA airplanes with regards to the means of the accident rates in which engine 
failure was listed as a cause.  The alternative ANCOVA results for Structural Failure 
were : F(2, 3) = 0; p = 1, indicating that there was no significant difference among 
aircraft accidents based certification policy in which Structural Failure was listed as a 
cause.  The interactions between pilot flight time and time on the airframe with aircraft 
certification basis were also not significant. 
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Qualitative Data 
Text mining was utilized to analyze the qualitative portion of the NTSB accident 
reports, specifically the narrative cause.  Only accidents in which LOC was listed as a 
cause were analyzed using text mining because LOC is the number one cause of 
accidents in GA.   
Text mining analysis for all aircraft certification categories in which LOC 
was listed as a cause.  Text mining was first conducted to analyze the narrative cause of 
all aircraft categories combined—Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, and E-AB—in which 
LOC was listed as a cause.  A total of 1,189 narratives were analyzed.  Table 20 shows a 
total of 23 concepts, along with their corresponding words and frequencies.  For the 
purpose of the text mining analysis the S-LSA and E-LSA categories were combined.  
Figure 18 shows the scree plot for the singular value decomposition analysis.  The graph 
indicates that the first four concepts account for more than 50% of the singular value 
decomposition. 
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Table 20.  Singular Values and Count of Words Table for Text Mining Analysis. 
 
Concept Singular Value 
 
Count Word Root 
Concept 1 
 
74.33 686 control 
Concept 2 
 
53.66 528 stall 
Concept 3 
 
46.71 476 airspe 
Concept 4 
 
44.56 322 loss 
Concept 5 
 
41.48 280 inadvert 
Concept 6 
 
39.96 258 land 
Concept 7 
 
38.43 202 maneuv 
Concept 8 
 
37.46 189 takeoff 
Concept 9 
 
36.66 167 inadequ 
Concept 10 
 
35.34 156 subsequ 
Concept 11 
 
33.86 155 collis 
Concept 12 
 
33.26 140 due 
Concept 13 
 
32.17 135 altitud 
Concept 14 
 
31.55 135 terrain 
Concept 15 
 
31.15 129 low 
Concept 16 
 
30.71 129 wind 
Concept 17 
 
30.22 126 climb 
Concept 18 
 
29.69 122 instrument 
Concept 19 
 
29.45 120 spin 
Concept 20 
 
29.36 118 improp 
Concept 21 
 
28.60 117 decis 
Concept 22 
 
28.44 115 in-flight 
Concept 23 
 
28.18 113 aerodynam 
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Figure 18.  Scree plot for text mining analysis for accidents in which LOC was listed as a 
cause. 
 
 
 
Figure 19 shows the scatter plot graph for the concepts extracted from the singular 
value decomposition.  The scatter plot appears to have three well defined groups of words 
or clusters.  Figure 20 shows a closer view of cluster 1.  Cluster 1 appears to have two 
sub-clusters.  The common words within cluster 1a are: tailwind, runway, mush, gust 
high, direct, delay, recovering, bounce, speed, final, flare, maintain, delay, and inability.  
This cluster appears to be associated with the take-off and landing phases of flight and 
involves un-stabilized approaches during windy/gusty conditions.  The words within 
cluster 1b are: fog, thunderstorm, limit, known, adverse, cruise, dark, ceiling, and Visual 
Flight Rules (VFR).  This cluster appears to be associated with cruise conditions in which 
adverse weather was a factor. 
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Scatterplot of Concept 2 against Concept 1
SVD word coefficients (text_minning) in Workbook3 25v*149c
Concept 2 = 6.1691E-5-0.052*x
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Figure 19.  Scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for accidents in which LOC 
was listed as a cause. 
 
 
 
Scatterplot of Concept 2 against Concept 1
SVD word coefficients (text_minning) in Workbook3 25v*149c
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Figure 20.  Detail of scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for accidents in 
which LOC was listed as a cause. 
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Cluster 2 includes the following words: instructor, failure, maintain, contributing, 
factor, airspeed, stall, maneuver, and improper.  This cluster is mostly associated with 
maneuvering flight, in most cases involving an instructor on-board, in which the 
contributing factor was failure to maintain appropriate airspeed resulting in a stall. 
Cluster 3 included the words: in-flight, loss, control, weather meteorological, 
instrument, condition, continued, lack, experience, plan, night, low, and ice.  This cluster 
is mostly associated with accidents involving flight into instrument meteorological 
conditions, mostly at night in low visibility, and in many cases, in icing conditions where 
planning, lack of experience and decision making was a factor. 
Text mining analysis for E-AB airplanes in which LOC was listed as a cause.  
A total of 266 narratives were analyzed.  Figure 21 shows the scatter plot graph for the 
concepts extracted from the singular value decomposition.  The scatter plot appears to 
have three well defined clusters of words.  Cluster 1 includes the words undetermined 
and takeoff.  A closer look into the narratives that include these words reveal that this 
cluster refers to mostly accidents during the takeoff phase of flight that resulted in a stall 
and spin due to undetermined reasons.  Cluster 2 includes the words: maneuver, in-flight, 
collision, and terrain; a closer look into the narratives that include these words reveal that 
6.25% of the E-AB accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause involved low altitude 
maneuvering and 7.8% of the E-AB accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause 
involved aerobatics.  Cluster  3  included  the  words:  land,  aerodynamic,  stall  spin,  pilot’s  
failure to maintain, airspeed, lack, and inadvertent.  This cluster is mostly associated with 
accidents  involving  the  landing  phase  of  flight  in  which  the  pilot’s  failure  to  maintain  
adequate airspeed resulted in a stall and spin. 
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Scatterplot of Concept 2 against Concept 1
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Figure 21.  Scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for E-AB airplane accidents 
in which LOC was listed as a cause. 
 
 
 
Text mining analysis for LSA airplanes in which LOC was listed as a cause.  
A total of 75 narratives were analyzed.  Figure 22 shows the scatter plot graph for the 
concepts extracted from the singular value decomposition.  The scatter plot appears to 
have two well defined clusters of words.  Cluster 1 includes the words take-off, land, 
climb, student, instructor, and loss.  This cluster is mostly associated with accidents 
involving the take-off, landing, and climb phases of flight involving instructional flight.  
Cluster 2 includes the words maneuver, airspeed, stall, aerodynamic, and inadvertent.  
This cluster is mostly associated with accidents involving maneuvers in which low 
airspeeds resulted in inadvertent aerodynamic stalls. 
 
Cluster 1 
Cluster 2 
Cluster 3 
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Scatterplot of Concept 2 against Concept 1
SVD word coefficients (text_minning) in Workbook3 3v*12c
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Figure 22.  Scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for LSA airplane accidents 
in which LOC was listed as a cause. 
 
 
 
Text mining analysis for CAR 3 airplanes in which LOC was listed as a 
cause.  A total of 618 narratives were analyzed.  Figure 23 shows the scatter plot graph 
for the concepts extracted from the singular value decomposition.  The scatter plot 
appears to have two well defined clusters of words.  Cluster 1 includes the words: take-
off, landing, stall, rudder, turbulence, departure, personnel, system, and maintenance.  
This cluster is mostly associated with accidents involving, take-offs, landings, systems, 
and maintenance issues.  Cluster 2 includes the words cruise, weather, special, 
disorientation, non-instrument, continued, night inadequate, lack, experience, decision, 
and dark (see Figures 24 and 25).  After analyzing the narratives that contained the most 
important concepts, this cluster is mostly associated with accidents involving bad 
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weather, low visibility at night, and non-instrument rated pilots in VFR flight into IMC 
conditions. 
Scatterplot of Concept 2 against Concept 1
SVD word coefficients (LOC_CAR3.sta) in Workbook1 3v*137c
Concept 2 = -0.0009+0.2325*x
-0.002 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.014
Concept 1
-0.030
-0.025
-0.020
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
C
on
ce
pt
 2
action
aerodynam
airspe
approach
associattempt
avoidb lanc
bounc
causal
certifi
climbolliscompenscontamin
continu
rosswi d
cruis
decis
delay
departur
descent
designdir ct
disorient
downdraft
encount
evalu
exceed
excess
x c tfla e
fli
flight
fogf llo
forc
gro sgu tgustihard
high
ice
im
impact
imp ir
in-flight
in bl
inadvert
inclu
inspect
in tal
instructor
instrument
i tent
land
l dlightlimit
low
mainten
ake
aneuv
m unt in
ush
night
non-instru
obtain
oper
partial
perform
personnel
pilot failure to maintainpreflight
p cedurr rre o
recoveri
reduc re edi
ll
rudder
runways le tee
stall
structursupervis
system
t k
takeoff
terrain
thund rstormtraffic
tr
turbul
tu undetermin
vfvisibl
visual
w t r
wing
 
Figure 23.  Scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for CAR 3 airplane 
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause. 
 
 
 
Scatterplot of Concept 2 against Concept 1
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Figure 24.  Detail of scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for CAR 3 airplane 
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause. 
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Figure 25.  Detail of weather related clusters for text mining analysis for CAR 3 airplane 
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause. 
 
 
 
Text mining analysis for Part 23 airplanes in which LOC was listed as a 
cause.  A total of 196 narratives were analyzed.  Figure 26 shows the scatter plot graph 
for the concepts extracted from the singular value decomposition.  The scatter plot 
appears to have two well defined clusters of words.  Cluster 1 includes the words 
take-off, land, decision, maneuver, inadvertent low altitude, and decision.  This cluster is 
mostly associated with accidents involving take-off, go-around, landing phases of flight, 
and low altitude maneuvering involving inadvertent spins in which  the  pilots’  decision  
making was a contributing factor.  Over 9% of the accidents involved low altitude 
maneuvers.  Cluster 2 includes the words special, disorientation, and instrument.  This 
cluster is mostly associated with spatial disorientation in instrument meteorological 
conditions. 
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Figure 26.  Scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for Part 23 airplane 
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause. 
 
 
 
After conducting text mining analysis by certification basis for LOC accidents, 
the results indicated that E-AB and LSA airplanes did not have clusters of words 
associated with low visibility, poor weather conditions, and VFR into IMC.  LSA 
airplanes indicated that some LOC accidents involved instruction during take-offs and 
landings.  Part 23 category had a cluster of words associated with spatial disorientation 
and instrument flight.  CAR 3 category had a cluster associated with low visibility, poor 
weather conditions, night, and VFR into IMC conditions. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the frequency of GA airplane accidents 
and accident rates on the basis of aircraft certification to determine whether or not 
differences in aircraft certification rules had an influence on accidents.  In addition, the 
narrative cause descriptions contained within the accident reports were analyzed to 
determine whether there were differences in the qualitative data for the different 
certification categories.  The certification categories examined were: Part 23, CAR 3, 
LSA, and E-AB.  The accident causes examined were those listed as: LOC, CFIT, Engine 
Failure, and Structural Failure in the time period between January 1, 2004, and December 
31, 2011.  The study concentrated on analyzing accidents involving GA fixed-wing, 
single-engine, reciprocating-piston airplanes.  The study employed a mixed methods 
analysis that used an explanatory sequential design, consisting of two phases.  The first 
phase  encompassed  the  collection  and  analysis  of  quantitative  data  to  address  the  study’s  
hypotheses.  The second phase consisted of the analysis of the qualitative data from the 
narrative section of the accident investigation reports utilizing text mining techniques. 
Discussion 
The Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA, E-LSA, and E-AB airworthiness certification 
categories were selected because they represent a wide spectrum of government oversight 
as it relates to aircraft certification.  Part 23 rules began with the initial set of simpler 
design standards and have progressed into a very comprehensive and strict set of rules 
that have evolved to address the safety issues of the more complex airplanes within the 
Part 23 category.  E-AB airplanes have the least amount of government oversight with 
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regards to aircraft certification.  The LSA category is a newer category that utilizes 
consensus standards for its certification approval process.  Because it would involve a 
lengthy and expensive re-certification process, CAR 3 airplanes, designed and 
manufactured under a simpler set of rules, have not been retrofitted or modified to take 
advantage of new safety enhancing technologies.  The GA fleet is comprised of over 
200,000 airplanes with an average age of 40 years (FAA, 2009).   
Population and sample.  The population for the study consisted of all U.S. fixed-
wing, single-engine, reciprocating-piston airplanes with maximum certificated takeoff 
weights of less than 12,500 pounds.  The sample consisted of accidents of single-engine 
piston fixed-wing airplanes with maximum certificated takeoff weights of less than 
12,500 pounds.  The airworthiness certification categories included in the sample were: 
(a) standard category, which also includes normal, utility and aerobatic; (b) LSA; and 
(c) amateur-built airplanes within the experimental category.  The airworthiness 
categories excluded from the sample were: limited, restricted, special flight, provisional, 
transport, and unknown.  The time period selected was based on the creation of the LSA 
category in 2004; LSA airplanes began production in 2005. 
A total of 6,455 accidents met the initial airworthiness certification criteria of this 
study.  The total number of accidents involving LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural 
Failure were 3,023 (see Table 8).  These accidents were utilized for the analyses to 
address the hypotheses.  The sample consisted of: 1,155 LOC accidents, 563 CFIT 
accidents, 973 Engine Failure accidents, and 332 Structural Failure accidents.  The 
number of accidents by certification category were: 1,786 accidents for CAR 3, 
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450 accidents for Part 23, 648 accidents for E-AB, 73 accidents for S-LSA, and 
66 accidents for E-LSA. 
Hypothesis testing.  The evaluation of eight hypotheses under investigation was 
conducted utilizing two main statistical methods: Chi-Square test and ANCOVA.  
Discussion of the statistical significance of the hypotheses follows. 
To address hypotheses one through four Chi-Square tests were performed to 
determine whether the different causes of accidents were distributed differently across 
certification basis categories; therefore, the null hypotheses were: there is no significant 
difference in the frequency of accidents among airplanes certified under Part 23, CAR 3, 
S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural Failure was 
listed as a cause between the years of 2004 and 2011.  Since only the accident 
frequencies were utilized for the Chi-Square test, the amount of activity or number of 
active airplanes for each category were not taken into account.  The Chi-Square test 
compares the observed and expected frequencies; the test determines if the expected 
values differ significantly from the observed values.  The standardized residuals show the 
difference between the expected frequencies and the observed frequencies.  The 
individual standardized residuals provide very useful information about the contribution 
of each of the expected and observed frequencies to the overall association that the 
Chi-Square statistic measures (Field, 2009).  Appendix Tables C7-C10 show the 
standardized residuals for the Chi-Square tests for each of the accident causes. 
H01.  The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the 
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified under Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, 
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause.  The 
118 
 
Chi-Square test indicated that there was a significant difference in the frequency of 
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause.  The post-hoc analysis indicated that the 
significant difference was among Part 23, CAR 3, and E-AB categories; however, it 
indicated no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among the 
S-LSA/E-LSA category for LOC accidents (see Appendix Table C1).  The standardized 
residuals also indicated that the CAR 3 and S-LSA/E-LSA categories had significant 
difference in frequencies; the Part 23 and E-AB categories did not have any significant 
residuals. 
H02.  The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the 
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, 
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause.  The 
Chi-Square test indicated that there was no significant difference in the frequency of 
accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause. 
H03.  The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the 
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, 
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a 
cause.  The Chi-Square test indicated that there was a significant difference in the 
frequency of accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause. 
H04.  The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the 
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, 
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a 
cause.  The Chi-Square test indicated that there was no significant difference in the 
frequency of accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause. 
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To address hypotheses five through eight a series of one-way factorial ANCOVA 
tests with covariates (ANCOVAs) was performed to determine whether there is a 
significant difference in the accident rates among airplanes certified under Part 
23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural 
Failure was listed as a cause after controlling for pilot flight time and number of hours on 
the  aircraft’s  airframe.    Therefore, the null hypotheses were: there is no significant 
difference in the accident rate among airplanes certified under Part 23/CAR 3, S-
LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural Failure was 
listed as a cause.  The CAR 3 and Part 23 categories were combined in one group and the 
S-LSA and E-LSA categories were combined in another group for this analysis as the 
total hours per year used to calculate the accident rate were only available for the 
combined categories.   
H05.  The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the 
accident rate among airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB, 
with regard to accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause.  The ANCOVA test 
indicated that there was no significant difference in the accidents rate among airplanes 
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB, with regard to accidents in which 
LOC was listed as a cause. 
H06.  The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the 
accident rate among airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB, 
with regard to accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause.  The ANCOVA test 
indicated that there was no significant difference in the accidents rate among airplanes 
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certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB, with regard to accidents in 
which CFIT was listed as a cause. 
H07.  The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the 
accident rate among airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB, 
with regard to accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause.  The ANCOVA 
test indicated that there was a significant difference in the accidents rate among airplanes 
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB, with regard to accidents in 
which Engine Failure was listed as a cause.  There was also a significant interaction 
between the certification basis and the effects of the number of total flight time of the 
pilot; there was no significant interaction between certification basis and the number of 
hours  on  the  airplane’s  airframe.  The pair-wise post-hoc analysis indicated that there 
were significant differences were between E-AB and Part 23/CAR 3 airplanes, and 
between E-AB and S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes; however, there was not a significant 
difference between Part 23/CAR 3 and S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes with regards to the 
means of the accident rates in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause.   
H08.  The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the 
accident rate among airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB, 
with regard to accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause.  The ANCOVA 
test indicated that there was no significant difference in the accidents rate among 
airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB, with regard to 
accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause. 
Text mining.  Text mining was used to analyze the narrative causes of accident 
reports.  Only the narrative causes of accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause were 
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analyzed.  The first analysis of accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause for all 
aircraft certification categories indicated three main groups of words or clusters.  The first 
cluster was associated with LOC during take-offs and landings, the second cluster was 
associated with maneuvering flight, and the third cluster was associated with low 
visibility, degraded weather conditions, and VFR flight into IMC.  Accidents involving 
Part 23 category had a cluster of words associated with spatial disorientation and 
instrument flight.  The CAR 3 category had a cluster associated with low visibility, poor 
weather conditions, night, and VFR flight into IMC conditions.  The E-AB and LSA 
airplanes did not have any clusters of words associated with low visibility, poor weather 
conditions, and VFR flight into IMC. 
Conclusions 
The results of the study indicated that GA aircraft certification rules do not have a 
statistically significant effect on the frequency of CFIT accidents or the accident rate.  
Based on the literature, CFIT fatal accidents have dropped 60% between 2001 and 2010 
(GAJSC, 2012).  This decrease in the number of CFIT accidents is attributed mainly to 
electronic devices, mainly in the form of handheld equipment, that have made a 
considerable contribution in the reduction of pilot workload (GAJSC, 2012).  
The results of the study indicated that GA aircraft certification rules have a 
statistically significant effect on the frequency of LOC accidents but not on the accident 
rate.  LOC accounted for 1,155 accidents, an accident rate of 0.99 per 100,000 hours 
flown, or 18% of all the accidents between 2004 and 2011, and is the number one cause 
of accidents in GA.  These results are consistent with previous studies and support the 
need to focus on LOC prevention for GA to reduce the overall frequency of GA accidents 
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and the accident rate (GAO, 2012; GAJSC, 2012; NTSB, 2012b).  Airplanes certified 
under CAR 3 rules accounted for 53.5%, or 618 of the accidents in which LOC was listed 
as a cause and also accounted for 62.65% of the total accidents between 2004 and 2011. 
The text mining analysis of the qualitative portion of the accident reports showed 
that CAR 3 airplanes, unlike the other categories, were involved in LOC accidents 
associated with low visibility, poor weather conditions, night, and VFR flight into IMC 
conditions.  CAR 3 airplanes were designed and manufactured prior to the 1960s and are 
the oldest airplanes of the GA fleet.  CAR 3 airplanes in most cases, have not been 
retrofitted to take advantage of the newer technologies that could possibly aid in the 
prevention of LOC accidents.  According to the literature, LOC accidents at night and in 
IMC would drop by 50% simply by installing autopilots in the more than 100,000 IFR 
capable GA airplanes (GAJSC, 2012).   
The results of the study indicated that GA aircraft certification rules have a 
statistically significant effect on the frequency of Engine Failure accidents and the 
accident rate.  The results of the study also indicated that there was a significant 
difference in the accident rate of Engine Failure accidents between E-AB and 
Part 23/CAR 3, and between E-AB and S LSA/E LSA airplanes; however, there was not 
a significant difference between airplanes certified under S-LSA/E-LSA or 
Part 23/CAR 3.  As found in the literature, many of the Engine Failure accidents in the 
E-AB category occur during the first few hours of operation of a newly built aircraft or 
shortly after being purchased by a new owner; the majority of these accidents are due to 
design and installation problems with the engine and fuel systems (NTSB, 2012b).  The 
majority of E-AB airplanes are built from commercially available kits rather than from 
plans or original designs (NTSB, 2012b).  As explained in the literature, a primary focus 
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of the FAA regulations that oversee the E-AB building process seeks to ensure that the 
majority of the construction of the airplane is performed by the builder (NTSB, 2012b).  
Airworthiness certificates are granted to the builder of an E-AB aircraft builder by the 
FAA based on the review of the paperwork and a one-time inspection of the airplane 
once  the  airplane  has  been  completed  (NTSB,  2012b).    A  functional  test  of  the  airplane’s  
fuel system is required by civil aviation authorities in other countries but it is not required 
by the FAA (NTSB, 2012b). 
The results of this study indicate that the average pilot flight times did not differ 
substantially among the different certification categories; this result is supported by the 
literature.  On the other hand, the literature also indicates that pilots of E-AB accident 
aircraft, on average, had considerably less flight experience in the make and model of 
E-AB airplane (NTSB, 2012b).  E-AB aircraft are not allowed to be operated for 
compensation or hire, which includes flight instruction; therefore, the difficulty of finding 
suitable E-AB aircraft and instructors available for training presents a barrier to pilots 
seeking transition training (NTSB, 2012b).   
The results of the study indicated that GA aircraft certification rules do not have a 
statistically significant effect on the frequency of Structural Failure accidents or the 
accident rate.  Structural Failure is one of the failures or malfunctions that aircraft 
certification is designed to prevent.  Structural Failure is not one of the leading causes of 
accidents in GA, and based on the results of this study, Structural Failure accidents 
accounted for 332 accidents, an accident rate of 0.30 per 100,000 hours flown, or 5% of 
all the accidents between 2004 and 2011.  Therefore, it appears that regardless of the 
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amount of government oversight with regards to certification, the FAA has been able to 
minimize the amount of accidents due to Structural Failure. 
In summary, GA aircraft certification rules do not have a statistically significant 
effect on aircraft accidents except on the frequency of LOC accidents, and on the 
frequency and accident rate of Engine Failure accidents.  With respect to LOC accidents, 
it appears that government oversight could have become an obstacle in the 
implementation and installation of new safety enhancing equipment into old aircraft that 
could possibly reduce the number of LOC accidents.  With respect to Engine Failure 
accidents, aircraft certification oversight within the E-AB category is precluding E-AB 
aircraft owners from being able to receive flight instruction and becoming proficient in 
specific E-AB models, and also from allowing professional organizations to complete and 
flight test their E-AB airplanes.  On the other hand, government oversight should focus 
on ensuring that E-AB aircraft owners perform a functional test before obtaining an 
airworthiness certificate.  A functional test could prevent some of the Engine Failure 
accidents that occur in the first few hours of operation of E-AB airplanes.   
Recommendations 
The results of this study indicate that there is a significant difference in the 
frequency of accidents and the accident rate among E-AB and the other two major 
categories: (a) Part23/CAR 3, and (b) S-LSA/E-LSA for accidents in which Engine 
Failure was listed as a cause.  Based on the literature and the results of this study, the 
FAA’s  oversight  emphasis  on  E-AB aircraft should be shifted to allow E-AB aircraft to 
be completed and flight tested by professional organizations, thereby reducing some of 
the accidents due to installation and flight test errors.  The FAA should also consider 
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allowing transition flight training in E-AB aircraft; thereby increasing pilot proficiency in 
specific types of E-AB airplanes.  In addition, to reduce Engine Failure accidents in 
E-AB aircraft, the  FAA  should  require  a  functional  test  of  the  airplane’s  systems,  
including the fuel system, before the airworthiness certificate is issued to the builder 
(NTSB, 2012b).   
To reduce the accident rate and the frequency of LOC accidents in GA it seems 
important to focus on the airplanes certified under CAR 3 rules for three reasons: 
(a) CAR 3 airplanes consist of the oldest airplanes of the GA fleet; (b) CAR 3 airplanes 
were designed and manufactured prior to the 1960s, and in most cases, have not been 
retrofitted to take advantage of the newer technologies; and (c) the text mining analysis 
showed that CAR 3 airplanes were involved in LOC accidents associated with poor 
weather conditions and VFR flight into IMC conditions.  The use of AOA indicators and 
autopilots to prevent LOC accidents should be assessed.  The FAA should facilitate the 
retrofit of the legacy fleet with safety enhancing technology if this technology proves to 
be helpful in the prevention of LOC accidents.  
As indicated by the text mining analysis of the narrative cause of the accident 
reports, the aircraft within each category are operated differently and have various needs; 
therefore, to reduce the number of LOC accidents in GA, each aircraft certification 
category needs to be addressed differently.  The words found within each of the text 
mining clusters have indicated the emphasis areas where additional training, technology, 
or awareness should be placed to reduce LOC accidents.  As seen in Table 11, the CAR 3 
airplanes have on average the largest number of hours on the airframe; however, the 
average pilot flight times do not differ substantially among any of the categories.  As 
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suggested in the literature, retrofitting these older airplanes to take advantage of new 
technologies might help in the reduction of LOC accidents.  Based on the clusters of 
words revealed in the text mining analysis, the areas of emphasis to reduce LOC 
accidents among CAR 3 airplanes should be: (a) avoiding VFR flight into IMC, 
(b) aeronautical decision making, (c) pre-flight planning, and (d) traffic pattern work 
especially during instructional flights.  To reduce LOC accidents among Part 23 
airplanes, the areas of emphasis should be: (a) traffic pattern work especially during 
instructional flights, and (b) spatial disorientation in instrument conditions.  To reduce 
LOC accidents among the E-AB airplanes, the areas of emphasis should be: (a) take-off, 
(b) landings, (c) maneuvering flight, and (d) low altitude maneuvering.  To reduce LOC 
accidents among the LSA airplanes, the areas of emphasis should include: (a) traffic 
pattern work especially during instructional flights, and (b) maneuvering flight.  
Advocacy groups like EAA and ASTM could be approached to disseminate information 
and conduct specialized training for each particular category, such as E-AB and LSA. 
The adoption of consensus standards for GA aircraft certification could be an 
appealing alternative.  Applying consensus standards has the potential of simplifying the 
retrofit of the legacy fleet of GA airplanes to encourage the installation of safety 
enhancements in a timely and economically viable way.  As supported by the literature, a 
risk management approach should be taken to analyze whether the current certification 
regulations are actually an obstacle to installing safety enhancing technology into the GA 
fleet (GAJSC, 2012).  Installing autopilots and AOA indicators on a certified airplane 
could cost between five to ten times more than installing these devices on an 
experimental airplane, which could represent between 10 to 50% of the average value of 
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a GA airplane (GAJSC, 2012).  The risks and benefits of installing autopilots and AOA 
indicators in older aircraft without a stringent, expensive, and time consuming 
certification process should be assessed. 
Recommendations for future research.  Future research should examine the 
impact of the use of technology in the prevention of LOC accidents and also in the 
improvement of aircraft crashworthiness.  Some of the technologies that have been 
identified in previous studies to possibly reduce LOC accidents in GA include autopilots 
and AOA indicators (GAJSC, 2012).  Devices like seatbelts with airbags and BRS 
systems have been identified as possible means to improve aircraft crashworthiness and 
survivability (FAA, 2009).   
Future research should also concentrate on a risk management study to determine 
the best approach to implementing new technologies into older airplanes.  The study 
should include the cost of the necessary changes in certification rules and the cost of the 
acquisition and installation of the new equipment. 
Future research might compare accidents due to LOC in which an autopilot was 
available in the airplane with accidents in which an autopilot was not available in the 
airplane.  This study could also include a risk-benefit analysis for the installation of 
autopilots in older airplanes. 
Future research may also focus on the impact of AOA indicators on LOC accident 
prevention.  An experiment can be performed involving special training using a control 
and an experimental group on the concepts of AOA and the use of AOA indicators.  The 
performance of identifying and preventing stalls utilizing an AOA indicator among the 
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control and the experimental groups of pilots can then be compared utilizing a simulator 
or a flight training device.  
Additional research could focus on whether airplanes that have seatbelts and/or 
airbags have better crashworthiness and survivability rates.  Accidents involving BRS 
devices installed in the airplanes might also be studied in order to research whether they 
have a better survivability rate. 
Recommendations for practice.  A risk management approach to analyze 
whether the current certification regulations are actually an obstacle to installing safety 
enhancing technology into the GA fleet should be applied.  The results from the text 
mining analysis indicate that CAR 3 airplanes were involved in LOC accidents associated 
with low visibility, poor weather conditions, night, and VFR flight into IMC conditions 
and could benefit from installing safety enhancing equipment such as autopilots and 
AOA indicators.   
Additional information regarding aircraft certification rules should be added to the 
NTSB database as well as a list of equipment installed on the airplanes, such as autopilots 
and AOA indicators.  In addition, the NTSB database should include any additional 
handheld technologies that were being used, such as an electronic tablet, mobile 
telephone, or GPS.  The number of active aircraft and number of hours flown per year 
should also be grouped and available by certification basis in order to have more 
information available for future research.  The number of hours on the engine should also 
be added to the NTSB accident report database. 
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Table B1.  Variables Utilized in the Study. 
 
NTSB Variable Name Variable Description Access Table 
Name 
ev_id Event identification number aircraft 
Regis_no Aircraft registration number aircraft 
Ntsb_no NTSB accident number aircraft 
damage Type of damage aircraft 
Acft_make Aircraft make aircraft 
Acft_model Aircraft model aircraft 
Cert_max_gr_wt Maximum certificated gross weight aircraft 
Homebuilt Is the airplane homebuilt? aircraft 
Total_seats Total number of seats aircraft 
fixed_retractable Fixed or retractable landing gear aircraft 
Afm_hrs Number of hours on airframe aircraft 
Acft_awy_cert Aircraft airworthiness certificate Dt_aircraft 
Crew_cert_code Crew certificate code Dt_flight_crew 
Crew_cert_instruct Flight instructor on-board? Dt_flight_crew 
Engine_type Type of engine engine 
Engine_mfgr Engine manufacturer engine 
Eng_model Engine model engine 
Power_units Units for engine power engine 
Hp_or_lbs Horse-power or pounds? engine 
Carb_fuel_injection Carbureted or fuel injected? engine 
Ev_type Type of event events 
Ev_year Year of event events 
Ev_month Month of event events 
Occurrence_code Occurrence code Event_sequence 
Occurrence_description Occurrence description Event_sequence 
Flight_hours Pilot total number of hours Flight_time 
Narr_cause Cause narrative narratives 
Note: The data was filtered for only: Part 91 operations; aircraft category: airplanes; 
maximum certificated gross weight under 12,500 pounds; U.S. registered aircraft only; 
single-engine; reciprocating (far_part 091; acft_category: AIR; Cert_max_gr_wt: 
<12,500, Acft_reg_cls:USUS, Num_eng: 1, Engine_type: recip). 
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Table B2.  NTSB Occurrences Codes. 
 
NTSB 
Codes 
NTSB Description Common Name 
250 LOSS OF CONTROL - IN FLIGHT LOC 
220 IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH OBJECT CFIT 
350 LOSS OF ENGINE POWER Engine Failure 
130 AIRFRAME/COMPONENT/SYSTEM 
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION (including in-flight 
breakup) 
Structural Failure 
Note.  NTSB codes found on the Occurrences table/Occurrence code Adapted from 
“Aviation Accident Database”, by NTSB, 2013. 
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APPENDIX C 
Tables 
C1 Chi-Square Test by Certification Basis. 
C2 Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance 
C3 Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for LOC 
Accidents in Groups of Two Years 
 
C4 Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for CFIT 
Accidents in Groups of Two Years 
 
C5 Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for Engine 
Failure Accidents in Groups of Two Years  
 
C6 Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for 
Structural Failure Accidents in Groups of Two Years 
 
C7 Counts, Expected Counts and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for LOC 
Accidents 
 
C8 Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for CFIT 
Accidents 
 
C9 Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for Engine 
Failure Accidents 
 
C10 Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for 
Structural Failure Accidents 
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Table C1.  Chi-Square Test by Certification Basis. 
 
Certification Basis Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
CAR 3 Pearson 
Chi-Square 
104.58 9 .000 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
111.64 9 .000 
N of Valid 
Cases 
1,786   
E-AB Pearson 
Chi-Square 
41.49 9 .000 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
42.65 9 .000 
N of Valid 
Cases 
648   
S-LSA/E-LSA Pearson 
Chi-Square 
8.16c 9 .518 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
11.03 9 .273 
N of Valid 
Cases 
139   
PART 23 Pearson 
Chi-Square 
43.22 9 .000 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
43.15 9 .000 
N of Valid 
Cases 
450   
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Table C2.  Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance. 
 
Years 
Cert. 
Basis Hours Flown 
No of 
Active A/C 
No. of 
Accidents 
Accident 
Rate 
Av. 
Pilot 
Flt 
Time 
Av. A/C 
Airframe 
Time 
2004 Part 23 15,363,000 146,613 764 4.97E-05 2,774 3,916 
2004 LSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 E-AB 990,000 19,165 149 1.51E-04 3,341 868 
2005 Part 23 13,739,000 148,101 691 5.03E-05 2,787 4,204 
2005 LSA 9,000 170 3 3.33E-04 1,654 58 
2005 E-AB 987,000 19,817 156 1.58E-04 3,221 366 
2006 Part 23 13,976,000 145,036 612 4.38E-05 2,321 4,305 
2006 LSA 66,000 1,273 12 1.82E-04 2,171 183 
2006 E-AB 899,000 19,316 120 1.33E-04 3,679 326 
2007 Part 23 13,571,000 147,569 637 4.69E-05 2,707 4,145 
2007 LSA 260,000 6,066 36 1.38E-04 3,390 265 
2007 E-AB 896,000 19,538 135 1.51E-04 3,313 312 
2008 Part 23 12,746,000 145,497 577 4.53E-05 2,627 4,510 
2008 LSA 293,000 6,811 49 1.67E-04 2,236 296 
2008 E-AB 872,000 19,767 134 1.54E-04 2,728 320 
2009 Part 23 11,730,000 140,649 607 5.17E-05 2,718 4,320 
2009 LSA 286,000 6,547 56 1.96E-04 2,916 329 
2009 E-AB 983,000 20,794 148 1.51E-04 4,007 402 
2010 Part 23 12,151,000 139,519 605 4.98E-05 3,100 4,408 
2010 LSA 311,000 6,528 42 1.35E-04 2,998 270 
2010 E-AB 911,000 21,270 127 1.39E-04 3,140 307 
2011 Part 23 13,574,031 184,706 589 4.34E-05 3,214 4,351 
2011 LSA 356,539 8,967 60 1.68E-04 2,427 583 
2011 E-AB 854,719 29,180 146 1.71E-04 3,474 408 
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Table C3.  Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for LOC 
Accidents in Groups of Two Years. 
 
Years Cert. 
Basis 
No. Acc. Hours Flown No Active 
A/C 
Acc. Rate 
with hrs 
flown 
Acc. Rate 
with no. 
A/C 
Av. 
Pilot 
Flt. 
Time 
Av. 
Airframe 
hrs 
04/05 Part 23 271 29,102,000 294,714 9.31E-06 9.31E-06 2,31 3,96 
06/07 Part 23 232 27,547,000 292,605 8.42E-06 8.42E-06 4,38 3,91 
08/09 Part 23 162 24,476,000 286,146 6.62E-06 6.62E-06 2,51 3,66 
10/11 Part 23 149 25,725,031 324,225 5.79E-06 5.79E-06 2,26 4,52 
04/05 LSA 1 9,000 170 1.11E-04 1.11E-04 2,99 90 
06/07 LSA 17 326,000 7,339 5.21E-05 5.21E-05 26,70 111 
08/09 LSA 25 579,000 13,358 4.32E-05 4.32E-05 2,83 634 
10/11 LSA 32 667,539 15,495 4.79E-05 4.79E-05 1,38 362 
04/05 E-AB 82 1,977,000 38,982 4.15E-05 4.15E-05 2,55 415 
06/07 E-AB 72 1,795,000 38,854 4.01E-05 4.01E-05 5,34 335 
08/09 E-AB 67 1,855,000 40,561 3.61E-05 3.61E-05 2,14 355 
10/11 E-AB 45 1,765,719 50,450 2.55E-05 2.55E-05 2,58 375 
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Table C4.  Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for CFIT 
Accidents in Groups of Two Years. 
 
Years Cert. 
Basis 
No. 
Acc. 
Hours 
Flown 
No 
Active 
A/C 
Acc. Rate 
with hrs 
flown 
Acc. Rate 
with no. A/C 
Av. Pilot 
Flt. 
Time 
Av. 
Airframe 
hrs 
04/05 Part 23 203 29,102,000 294,714 6.98E-06 6.98E-06 3,055 4,204 
06/07 Part 23 169 27,547,000 292,605 6.13E-06 6.13E-06 5,287 4,409 
08/09 Part 23 75 24,476,000 286,146 3.06E-06 3.06E-06 3,091 4,276 
10/11 Part 23 34 25,725,031 324,225 1.32E-06 1.32E-06 2,578 3,425 
04/05 LSA 0 9,000 170 0 0 0 0 
06/07 LSA 3 326,000 7,339 9.20E-06 9.20E-06 2,135 323 
08/09 LSA 4 579,000 13,358 6.91E-06 6.91E-06 427 90 
10/11 LSA 0 667,539 15,495 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0 0 
04/05 E-AB 39 1,977,000 38,982 1.97E-05 1.97E-05 3,097 710 
06/07 E-AB 18 1,795,000 38,854 1.00E-05 1.00E-05 2,666 271 
08/09 E-AB 14 1,855,000 40,561 7.55E-06 7.55E-06 1,841 284 
10/11 E-AB 4 1,765,719 50,450 2.27E-06 2.27E-06 1,870 674 
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Table C5.  Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for Engine 
Failure Accidents in Groups of Two Years. 
 
Years Cert. 
Basis 
No. 
Acc. 
Hours Flown No Active 
A/C 
Acc. Rate 
with hrs 
flown 
Acc. Rate 
with no. 
A/C 
Av. Pilot 
Flt. Time 
Av. 
Airframe 
hrs 
04/05 Part 23 82 29,102,000 294,714 2.82E-06 2.82E-06 4,055 4,126 
06/07 Part 23 57 27,547,000 292,605 2.07E-06 2.07E-06 7,250 4,414 
08/09 Part 23 53 24,476,000 286,146 2.17E-06 2.17E-06 3,615 4,311 
10/11 Part 23 35 25,725,031 324,225 1.36E-06 1.36E-06 4,584 3,797 
04/05 LSA 0 9,000 170 0 0 0 0 
06/07 LSA 7 326,000 7,339 2.15E-05 2.15E-05 3,280 322 
08/09 LSA 14 579,000 13,358 2.42E-05 2.42E-05 2,892 232 
10/11 LSA 22 667,539 15,495 3.30E-05 3.30E-05 6,845 1,031 
04/05 E-AB 37 1,977,000 38,982 1.87E-05 1.87E-05 3,150 389 
06/07 E-AB 46 1,795,000 38,854 2.56E-05 2.56E-05 8,112 261 
08/09 E-AB 45 1,158,000 26,314 3.89E-05 3.89E-05 1,946 300 
10/11 E-AB 60 1,765,719 50,450 3.40E-05 3.40E-05 3,076 311 
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Table C6.  Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for Structural 
Failure Accidents in Groups of Two Years. 
 
Years Cert. 
Basis 
No. 
Acc. 
Hours Flown No Active A/C Acc. Rate 
with hrs 
flown 
Acc. Rate 
with no. 
A/C 
Av. 
Pilot 
Flt. 
Time 
Av. 
Airframe 
hrs 
04/05 Part 23 82 29,102,000 294,714 2.82E-06 2.82E-06 4055 4,126 
06/07 Part 23 57 2,7547,000 292,605 2.07E-06 2.07E-06 7250 4,414 
08/09 Part 23 53 2,4476,000 286,146 2.17E-06 2.17E-06 3615 4,311 
10/11 Part 23 35 25,725,031 324,225 1.36E-06 1.36E-06 4584 3,797 
04/05 LSA 0 9,000 170 0 0 0 0 
06/07 LSA 3 326,000 7,339 9.20E-06 9.20E-06 9785 1,221 
08/09 LSA 6 579,000 13,358 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 994 100 
10/11 LSA 5 667,539 15,495 7.49E-06 7.49E-06 2158 91 
04/05 E-AB 24 19,77,000 38,982 1.21E-05 1.21E-05 3979 1,506 
06/07 E-AB 22 1,795000 38,854 1.23E-05 1.23E-05 6153 257 
08/09 E-AB 13 1,276,000 27,605 1.02E-05 1.02E-05 3258 436 
10/11 E-AB 23 1,765,719 50,450 1.30E-05 1.30E-05 5474 337 
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Table C7.  Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for LOC 
Accidents. 
 
Years  CAR3 E-AB LSA PART23 Total 
2004-2005 Count 222 82 1 49 354 
Expected Count 189.4 81.5 23.0 60.1 354.0 
Residual 32.6 .5 -22.0 -11.1  
Std. Residual 2.4 .1 -4.6 -1.4  
2006-2007 Count 164 72 17 68 321 
Expected Count 171.8 73.9 20.8 54.5 321.0 
Residual -7.8 -1.9 -3.8 13.5  
Std. Residual -.6 -.2 -.8 1.8  
2008-2009 Count 114 67 25 48 254 
Expected Count 135.9 58.5 16.5 43.1 254.0 
Residual -21.9 8.5 8.5 4.9  
Std. Residual -1.9 1.1 2.1 .7  
2010-2011 Count 118 45 32 31 226 
Expected Count 120.9 52.0 14.7 38.4 226.0 
Residual -2.9 -7.0 17.3 -7.4  
Std. Residual -.3 -1.0 4.5 -1.2  
 Total Count 618 266 75 196 1155 
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Table C8.  Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for CFIT 
Accidents. 
 
Years  CAR3 E-AB LSA PART23 Total 
2004-2005 Count 173 39 0 30 242 
Expected Count 174.1 32.2 3.0 32.7  
Residual -1.1 6.8 -3.0 -2.7  
Std. Residual -.1 1.2 -1.7 -.5   
2006-2007 Count 144 18 3 25 190 
Expected Count 136.7 25.3 2.4 25.6  
Residual 7.3 -7.3 .6 -.6  
Std. Residual .6 -1.5 .4 -.1   
2008-2009 Count 61 14 4 14 93 
Expected Count 66.9 12.4 1.2 12.6  
Residual -5.9 1.6 2.8 1.4  
Std. Residual -.7 .5 2.6 .4   
2010-2011 Count 27 4 0 7 38 
Expected Count 27.3 5.1 .5 5.1  
Residual -.3 -1.1 -.5 1.9  
Std. Residual -.1 -.5 -.7 .8   
 Total Count 405 75 7 76 563 
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Table C9.  Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for Engine 
Failure Accidents. 
 
Years  CAR3 E-AB LSA PART23 Total 
2004-2005 Count 158 44 0 24 226 
Expected Count 136.3 50.2 10.0 29.5 226.0 
Residual 21.7 -6.2 -10.0 -5.5  
Std. Residual 1.9 -.9 -3.2 -1.0  
2006-2007 Count 126 46 7 19 198 
Expected Count 119.5 44.0 8.8 25.8 198.0 
Residual 6.5 2.0 -1.8 -6.8  
Std. Residual .6 .3 -.6 -1.3  
2008-2009 Count 141 66 14 42 263 
Expected Count 158.7 58.4 11.6 34.3 263.0 
Residual -17.7 7.6 2.4 7.7  
Std. Residual -1.4 1.0 .7 1.3  
2010-2011 Count 162 60 22 42 286 
Expected Count 172.5 63.5 12.6 37.3 286.0 
Residual -10.5 -3.5 9.4 4.7  
Std. Residual -.8 -.4 2.6 .8  
 Total Count 587 216 43 127 973 
 
  
150 
 
Table C10.  Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for Structural 
Failure Accidents. 
 
Years  CAR3 E-AB LSA PART23 Total 
2004-2005 Count 64 24 0 18 106 
Expected Count 56.2 29.1 4.5 16.3 106.0 
Residual 7.8 -5.1 -4.5 1.7  
Std. Residual 1.0 -.9 -2.1 .4  
2006-2007 Count 45 22 3 12 82 
Expected Count 43.5 22.5 3.5 12.6 82.0 
Residual 1.5 -.5 -.5 -.6  
Std. Residual .2 -.1 -.2 -.2  
2008-2009 Count 40 22 6 13 81 
Expected Count 42.9 22.2 3.4 12.4 81.0 
Residual -2.9 -.2 2.6 .6  
Std. Residual -.4 .0 1.4 .2  
2010-2011 Count 27 23 5 8 63 
Expected Count 33.4 17.3 2.7 9.7 63.0 
Residual -6.4 5.7 2.3 -1.7  
Std. Residual -1.1 1.4 1.4 -.5  
 Total Count 176 91 14 51 332 
 
 
